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IS A FOREIGN STATE A "PERSON"?
DOES IT MATTER?: PERSONAL JURISDICTION,
DUE PROCESS, AND THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
KAREN HALVERSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Gustav Klimt's 1907 painting "Portrait of Adele BlochBauer I" (Adele I), displayed at the Austrian Gallery in Vienna,
is considered to be a masterpiece and one of Klimt's principal
works. 1 Maria Altmann, a niece and heir of Adele BlochBauer, recently brought suit against the Republic of Austria
(Austria) seeking restitution for the expropriation of six of
Klimt's works, including Adele I. These six paintings together
are valued at roughly $150 million. 2 Altmann alleges that the
six paintings were taken illegally from the family in 1938 when
the Nazis invaded Austria. Austria moved to dismiss the claim,
arguing among other things that it was immune from suit
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).3
In an extraordinary decision, Judge Florence-Marie
Cooper of the Central District of California denied Austria's
motion to dismiss. Judge Cooper's decision centers on the applicability of an exception to immunity under the FSIA for ac* Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School. J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1990. Thanks to Kristin Hansen, Sarah Haule, and Kristen Clayton for excellent research assistance and to Donald Beschle and Allen Kamp
for helpful comments on prior drafts of this article.
1. Adele I is perhaps the most dramatic example of Klimt's "golden
phase," in which he made liberal use of gold and gilding in his portraits.
One expert noted that Adele I and similar portraits "are among the most
significant pictures within [Klimt's] oeuvre of turn-of-the-century women."
GILLEs NPRET, GUSTAV KLIMT 1862-1918, at 65 (1997). An on-line reproduction of Adele I can be viewed at http://www.bertc.com/klimt_8.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
2. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1192 n.2 (C.D.
Cal. 2001). The other Klimt paintings included in the claim are Adele
Bloch-Bauer II, Beechwood, Apple Tree I, Houses in Unterach am Attersee,
and Amalie Zuckerkandl. See id.
3. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999).
115
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tions seeking rights in illegally expropriated property. Specifically, the FSIA provides for an exception to immunity in cases
in which rights in property taken in violation of international
law are at issue and the property at stake is owned or operated
by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state4 that is
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States. 5 Judge
Cooper found that the expropriation exception applied, reasoning that the paintings were exhibited (or "operated") by
the Austrian Gallery, an instrumentality of the Austrian state
6
engaged in commercial activity in the United States.
Austria also argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction because Austria and the Austrian Gallery lacked "minimum contacts" with the United States. 7 In response to this
argument, Judge Cooper simply held that foreign states are
not "persons" for purposes of the Due Process Clause." In support of this proposition, Judge Cooper cited a line of federal
district court decisions involving the "anti-terrorism amend4. The FSIA defines a "foreign state" to include both a political subdivision of a state and an "agency or instrumentality" of a state, which includes
any entity organized under the laws of the state that is at least majorityowned by the state (or a political subdivision of the state). 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(a)-(b).
5. The FSIA allows an exception to immunity in any case
in which rights in property taken in violation of international law
are in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such
property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state;
or that property or any property exchanged for such property is
owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign
state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial
activity in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (3) (expropriation exception). Thus there are two possibilities under the exception: either (i) the expropriated property (or its
proceeds) is present in the United States in connection with the commercial
activity of the foreign state or (ii) such property is owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state engaged in commercial activity
in the United States. The Altmann case, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, involved the
second of these two possibilities.
6. The gallery was found to be engaged in commercial activity in the
United States because it published a museum catalogue available for
purchase by U.S. residents and advertised its collection in the United States.
See Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
7. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see also infra
note 37 and accompanying text.
8. See Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1206-08.
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ment" to the FSLA-a recent amendment allowing an exception to immunity for certain terrorist activity, torture, or hos9
tage-taking by a foreign government or agent. Courts have
applied the anti-terrorism amendment to assert jurisdiction

and in some cases issue judgments against a number of

"rogue" governments for extraterritorial terrorist acts: Cuba,
for the downing of two U.S. aircraft over international air-

space; 10 Iran, for involvement in the terrorist bombing of a bus

in Israel" and for holding Terry Anderson and other Ameri12
cans hostage in Lebanon; Libya, for its role in the bombing
13
of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; and Iraq, for
4
In sevcommitting acts of torture against four Americans.'
eral of these decisions, the courts held that the "minimum
contacts" test does not apply to suits against foreign states15 because states are not entitled to constitutional protection.
The Supreme Court has never addressed directly the applicability of the Due Process Clause to foreign sovereign defendants. However, in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Justice
Scalia suggested that a state may not be a "person" for pur16
Since Weltover, a number of
poses of the Due Process Clause.

9. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1994) (codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a) (7)).
10. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
11. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
12. Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C.
2000); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998).
13. Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325
(E.D.N.Y. 1998), affd in part, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998).
14. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
15. See Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 19-23 (holding that a foreign state is not a
"person" for due process purposes but finding minimum contacts in any
event); Daliberti,97 F. Supp. 2d at 48-49 (suggesting that a foreign state is not
a "person"); see also World Wide Minerals v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 98, 103 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding in a case involving the commercial
activity exception that no minimum contacts analysis was required for the
foreign state defendants involved); cf.Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, 110 F. Supp. 2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2000) ("the process of obtaining
personal jurisdiction under the FSIA does not follow the traditional approach outlined in International Shoe Co.").
16. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
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circuit courts also have questioned whether a foreign sovereign defendant is entitled to due process. 17
Both policy considerations and precedent suggest that a
foreign state is not a "person" for due process purposes.' 8
Resolving the constitutional question, however, is only a part
of the analysis. Even if a foreign state is not a "person," and
thus is unable to assert the protections afforded individuals
under the Due Process Clause, it does not follow that U.S.
courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign state is
unfettered unless Congress unambiguously provides to that effect. The rules of personal jurisdiction have not always been
linked to the Due Process Clause, and perhaps should not be
today. 19 This article does not attempt to make that argument,
but instead proposes an approach to interpreting the FSIA in
the event that a foreign state is not held to be a "person" for
Due Process Clause purposes.
Part II of this article sets forth a brief introduction to the
FSIA as it was enacted in 1976, the applicability of the "minimum contacts" test to foreign states, and two subsequent
amendments to the FSLA that carve out additional exceptions
to sovereign immunity but do not contain jurisdictional nexus
requirements. Part III explains why, although a foreign state
may stand outside the constitutional structure, the Due Process Clause as it relates to personal jurisdiction can be distin17. See, e.g., S & Davis Int'l Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292,
1301 (11 th Cir. 2000) (raising the due process question raised in Weltover but
finding minimum contacts in any event); Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of State of
Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (raising the due process question raised in Weltover but proceeding on the assumption that a foreign sovereign is entitled to due process); Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indon.,
148 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 1998) (questioning whether the holding in Texas
Trading & Milling Co. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.
1981), that "the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the
FSIA was subject to the same constitutional constraints which otherwise regulate every exercise of personal jurisdiction," remains good law).
18. See discussion infra Part III.A (addressing the constitutional status of
foreign states).
19. Indeed, the Draft Hague Convention on Foreign Judgments calls
into question the continued viability of this approach, since the jurisdictional rules recognized under the Convention generally follow the European
approach to personal jurisdiction. See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30,
1999, at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html [hereinafter
Draft Hague Convention]; infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text.
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guished from other constitutional rights in light of the rules of
personal jurisdiction under international law and the historical development of personal jurisdiction in the United States
prior to Pennoyer v. Neff2( Part III also spells out the international law on jurisdiction to adjudicate, and explains the status
of customary international law in the U.S. constitutional
framework. Part IV considers the implications of this analysis
for the FSIA and its amendments.
II.

BACKGROUND TO THE FSIA AND THE JURISDICTIONAL
NEXUS REQUIREMENT

A.

1976 Statute

The basic purpose of the FSIA was to set forth consistent
21
guidelines for determining sovereign immunity. Prior to the
adoption of the FSIA in 1976, immunity was determined by the
State Department on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps the most
important exception to sovereign immunity was established in
the United States in 1952 when the State Department em22 Under the
braced the restrictive theory of state immunity.
restrictive theory, immunity is not absolute, but rather is relinquished when the foreign state engages in commercial or pri20. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).

21. The House Report accompanying the FSIA cites the following purpose:
A principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of
sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial
branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial
decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures
that insure due process.
FLOWERS, JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN

STATES, H.R. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976). Another purpose of the FSIA was to
codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. See Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
33, 33-34 (1978).
22. The State Department's adoption of this policy is evidenced in a letter from Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate to the U.S. Attorney General,
dated May 19, 1952, commonly referred to as the "Tate Letter." The letter
concludes that, in order to better conform with state practice and to facilitate commercial dealings of foreign states, "it will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity ......
Tate Letter, DEP'T ST. BULL.,June 1952, at 984, 985, reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976).
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vate activity. 2 3 Until the passage of the FSIA, courts consider-

ing whether a foreign sovereign defendant had engaged in
commercial activity deferred to the State Department's application of the restrictive theory to individual cases, a process
that provided little guidance or certainty to litigants. 24
The FSIA is a complicated statute, for it sets out to achieve
a number of objectives. First, the FSLA provides the exclusive
basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the
United States25 and specifies that federal courts shall adjudicate claims against foreign states. 26 The FSIA thus intertwines
issues of personal and subject matter jurisdiction over foreign
states with that of sovereign immunity. Simply stated, federal
court jurisdiction over a foreign state exists where process has
been validly served and one of the exceptions to immunity can
23. The Tate Letter explains the difference between the "classical" and
the "restrictive" theories of sovereign immunity:
According to the classical or absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a sovereign cannot, without his consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).
Id.
24. As the House Report to the FSIA explains, although the State Department adopted the "restrictive theory" to sovereign immunity, in practice exceptions to immunity were not always granted, due to diplomatic pressures
brought to bear on the State Department from foreign governments seeking
immunity. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487 at 7. Thus, the Department was in the
"awkward position" of attempting to apply a legal rule to cases undergoing
litigation in U.S. courts without the benefit of hearing witnesses or taking
other evidence and without appellate review. Id. at 8.
25. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989). In this case, a Liberian oil tanker was attacked in international waters by an Argentine military aircraft during the Falkland Islands war. The
owner of the oil tanker brought suit against Argentina in U.S. court, claimingjurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which allows jurisdiction in
U.S. courts for torts committed in violation of international law. See id. at
432. The Supreme Court refused to find jurisdiction, ruling that the FSIA
provides the "sole basis" for obtaining jurisdiction in suits against foreign
sovereigns. Id. at 434. Since the attack was committed outside of U.S. territory, no exception to immunity under the FSIA applied. See id. at 439-41.
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994) (providing that federal district courts
shall have original jurisdiction over any claim with respect to which the foreign state cannot claim immunity under the FSIA).
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be demonstrated. 27 Once an exception to immunity is found,
the FSIA provides that a foreign state may be liable "in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances." 28 Finally, the statute specifies
which state assets may29 be attached to execute a judgment
against a foreign state.
As for the scope of immunity under the FSIA, the statute
sets forth a rule of absolute immunity and then lists specified
exceptions to immunity. In addition to an exception for certain suits in admiralty to enforce maritime liens,30 the FSIA as
enacted in 1976 provided an exception to immunity in five

cases: waiver,3 1 commercial activity,3 2 expropriation (the ex-

ception at issue in Altmann),33 the determination of rights in
property present in the United States, 34 and certain torts occurring within U.S. territory. 35 It is significant that each of the
exceptions to immunity under the 1976 statute (other than
the waiver and maritime lien exceptions) contains a jurisdictional nexus requirement-that is, a requirement that the
property at issue or the conduct surrounding the claim bears a
territorial connection to the United States. The House Report
accompanying the FSLA suggests that this requirement was included to ensure that due process concerns were met before
asserting personal jurisdiction over a foreign state. The House
27. See id. (requiring that service of process be made in accordance with
the FSIA). The provisions in the FSIA specifying special procedures for the
service of process on foreign states are codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1994).

28. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (Supp. V 1999).
29. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (determining
when the assets of a foreign state may be immune from attachment, arrest,

and execution).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1994).

31. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1) (1994).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) (1994).'
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (3) (1994); see also supra note 5 and accompa-

nying text.
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (4) (1994).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (5) (1994). Although the language of the statute refers to injury occurring in the United States, courts have interpreted
this exception to immunity as requiring that the tortious act occur in the
United States as well. See Olsen v. Republic of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 645
(9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the legislative history of the tort exception indicates that the "tortious act or omission must occur within the jurisdiction of
the United States").
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Report cites to InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,3 6 explaining
that the jurisdictional nexus requirement "prescribes the necessary contacts which must exist before our courts can exercise
personal jurisdiction.

' 37

An examination of the commercial activity exception illustrates the close correlation between the jurisdictional nexus requirement in the statute and the "minimum contacts" requirement of InternationalShoe. Section 1605 (a) (2) of the FSIA provides an exception to sovereign immunity where
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon
an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
38
direct effect in the United States.
In other words, Section 1605(a) (2) requires that the action be based on one of three types of U.S.-based conduct: (i)
continuous activity within the United States; (ii) an act conducted within the United States; or (iii) an act conducted
outside the United States which has a "direct effect" in the
United States. Each of the permissible bases for jurisdiction
outlined in the commercial activity exception thus requires either U.S.-based conduct or conduct that directly affects the
United States.
The commercial activity exception is further analyzed below. The basic point to be emphasized here is that the FSIA,
as originally enacted in 1976, was drafted expressly to incorporate limits on personal jurisdiction with respect to each exception to immunity. Indeed, the intent of Congress in the FSIA
was to treat foreign state defendants similar to other "persons"
who are entitled to due process protection.3 9 As we will see,
36. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
37. FLOWERS, JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST
FOREIGN STATES, H.R. No. 94-1487, at 13 (1976).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) (1994).
39. This point was acknowledged by the drafters of the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 453 (Reporters' Note 3) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] ("it was apparently the intention of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act that foreign states be treated like private enti-
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the same cannot be said with respect to the exceptions to immunity that were later added to the FSIA.
B.

MIA Amendments

Since its adoption in 1976, the FSIA has been amended
twice to include additional exceptions to immunity. It was
amended in 1988 to add a new exception for actions to enforce or confirm arbitration awards either issued in the United
States or covered under an international agreement for the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards (arbitration
amendment) .40 The legislation enacting the amendment was
entitled "Implementation of the Inter-American Convention
' 41
on International Commercial Arbitration." The Inter-Ameri-

can Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Inter-American Convention) 42 is an international agreement between the United States and other members of the Organiza,4 3
tion of American States, similar to the New York Convention
for the mutual recognition and enforcement of international
arbitration awards. The apparent purpose of the arbitration
amendment was to facilitate the enforcement of international
arbitration agreements by clarifying that a foreign state's
agreement to submit a dispute to international commercial arbitration amounts to a waiver of sovereign immunity in any
44
suit to enforce arbitral awards relating to such agreements.
ties for the purpose of determining the necessary connection with the forum."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (providing that a
foreign state under the FSIA shall be liable "in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances").
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (6) (1994). The exception also applies if the
underlying claim, but for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been
brought under the FSIA. See id.
41. Implementation of the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, Pub. L. No. 100-669, 102 Star. 3969 (1988).
42. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, opened for signatureJan.30, 1975, 104 Stat. 448 (1990), O.A.S.T.S. No. 42
[hereinafter Inter-American Convention]. The United States became a signatory to the Inter-American Convention effective Oct. 27, 1990.
43. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signatureJun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]; see infra note 259 and accompanying text.
44. In statements on the House floor supporting the bill that became the
1988 amendment, the stated purpose of the legislation was to ensure that
sovereign immunity (in addition to the related Act of State doctrine) would
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Under existing case law in 1988, a number of courts had held
that the waiver exception of the FSIA applied to agreements to
submit a dispute to international arbitration, but other courts
had disagreed with this interpretation. 45 The arbitration
amendment was designed to resolve this conflict between
courts, and to comply with the United States's obligations
under international agreements relating to the recognition
46
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
Congress amended the FSIA a second time as part of the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (antiterrorism amendment),47 this time to add an exception to immunity for certain terrorist activities. 48 This anti-terrorism
not be used to "frustrate" the effect of an arbitration agreement or to "interfere with the enforcement of an arbitral award entered against a foreign
state." 134 CONG. REC. H10678 (Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
In supporting an earlier version of the legislation, Senator Lugar noted
the need to clarify that an agreement by a sovereign to arbitrate a dispute
should be interpreted as a waiver of immunity: "Currently, agreements and
awards are enforced under the provisions of the FSIA that concern explicit
or implied waivers of immunity. Although courts are finding that arbitral
agreements constitute waivers in the appropriate cases, the amendment
would give more explicit guidance to judges in dealing with these issues."
132 CONG. Ric. 28000 (Oct. 2, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
45. See infra note 263 and accompanying text. Note that a finding of implied waiver of immunity from an international arbitration agreement also
may extend to any action brought to enforce the arbitration award. See
GEORGES R. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (A STUDY IN CONFLICT AVOIDANCE) 73 (1990).
46. These agreements include in particular the Inter-American Convention, supra note 42, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signatureMar.
18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention],
and the New York Convention, supra note 43. The United States became a
signatory to the New York Convention effective Dec. 29, 1970. For a discussion of U.S. obligations under the New York Convention, see infra note 260
and accompanying text.
47. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). The anti-terrorism amendment also
amended the FSIA to allow an exception to immunity from attachment and
execution of foreign state property for the satisfaction ofjudgments brought
under the anti-terrorism amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (7), (f) (Supp.

V 1999).
48. For a recent analysis of the anti-terrorism amendment and some of
the litigation that has ensued, see S. Jason Baletsa, The Cost of Closure: A
Reexamination of the Theory and Practice of the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign
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amendment to the FSIA provides an exception to sovereign
immunity in certain personal injury or wrongful death actions
against a foreign state involving either torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, "or the provision of
material support or resources" for such an act.49 The excep-

tion does not apply where neither the claimant nor the victim
is a U.S. national. Significantly, the exception only applies to
foreign states that are designated by the State Department as
state sponsors of terrorism, which at the present includes only
a handful of "rogue" states-Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Ko50
rea, Sudan, and Syria.
Sovereign Immunities Act, 148 U. PA. L. Riv. 1247 (2000). See alsoJoseph W.
Glannon,&Jeffrey Atik, Politics andPersonalJurisdiction:Suing State Sponsors of
Terrorism Under the 1996 Amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 87
GEO. L.J. 675, 685-87 (1999); Lee M. Caplan, The Constitution andJurisdiction
over ForeignStates: The 1996 Amendment to the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act in
Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (2001).
49. The anti-terrorism amendment allows an exception to immunity
under the FSIA in cases, not otherwise covered under the commercial activity exception, where
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material
support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18) for
such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged
in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency,
except that the court shall decline to hear such a claim under this
paragraphif the foreign state was not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979
(50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)) or section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) at the time the act occurred,
unless later so designated as a result of such act; and even if the
foreign state is or was so designated, if(i) the act occurred in the foreign state against which the
claim has been brought and the claimant has not afforded the
foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in
accordance with accepted international rules of arbitration; or
(ii) neither the claimant nor the victim was a national of the
United States (as that term is defined in section 101 (a) (22) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act) when the act upon
which the claim is based occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. V 1999).
50. See 48 C.F.R. 252.209-7001 (2001) (defining "terrorist country" as one
so determined by the Secretary of State and providing the list of countries).
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The legislative history to the anti-terrorism amendment
indicates that it was adopted out of concerns relating to the
need to better protect the United States from torture and similar acts of foreign governments conducted abroad, such as the
abuse at issue in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson.51 Senate hearings on a
predecessor bill to the amendment 52 included discussions of
the FSIA's limitations in addressing human rights abuses in
cases such as Nelson.53 Several victims of human rights abuses
at the hands of foreign states appeared and offered their testimony. 54 In addition, Congress sought a means to impose liability on state agencies and instrumentalities that provided
funding and other support for international terrorism, such as
the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York
55
City.

State andJustice Department officials opposed passage of

the amendment, citing concerns that the creation of new bases
for jurisdiction in U.S. courts might expose the United States
to new remedies that could be used against it overseas, 56 and
commenting that the vast extraterritorial scope of the exception would "diverge significantly" from international practice
51. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993); see also infra note 195

and accompanying text.
52. See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearings on S. 825 before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Judiciary Committee, 103d
Cong. (1994), microformed on CIS No. 96:S521-11 (Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter 1994 Hearings]. S.825 was a predecessor bill to what became the antiterrorism amendment.
53. See id. at 3 (testimony of Rep. Romano L. Mazzoli) (noting that the
State Department in the Nelson case "sided with a foreign sovereign against
an aggrieved U.S. citizen").
54. See id. at 31 (testimony of Auschwitz survivor Hugo Princz and former
hostages David P. Jacobsen, Joseph Cicippio, and Clinton A. Hall).
55. See id. at 1 (testimony of Sen. Howell Heflin) (making reference to
the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center). To emphasize the urgency
of combating international terrorism, Senator Arlen Specter testified that,
between 1980 and 1994, more than 6500 international terrorist incidents
had occurred, killing over 5100 and wounding 12,500. See id. at 23 (testimony of Sen. Arlen Specter). Senator Specter also brought up the taking of
U.S. hostages in Lebanon by terrorists sponsored by the Iranian government
and noted that the purpose of the anti-terrorism amendment was to allow
recourse against foreign governments, such as Iran, that act as perpetrators
of such acts of terrorism. See id.
56. See id. at 9 (testimony of Stuart Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
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57
and risk undermining the overall effectiveness of the FSIA.
In response to these concerns, legislators emphasized the urgency of fighting international terrorism 58 and suggested that
the amendment was consistent with the international law concept of universal jurisdiction. Senator Arlen Specter, in particular, noted that under international customary law, piracy and
torture are considered international crimes covered by the
principle of universal jurisdiction:
Somebody who commits torture may be prosecuted
[W] here a
wherever that person may be found ....
accessory
an
co-conspirator,
is
a
foreign government
before the fact or an accessory after the fact, it is just
should not allow our citizens
unconscionable that 5we
9
to utilize our courts.
Although the bill proposed by Senator Specter was directed at foreign state support of "acts of international terror-

ism," 60 the final text of the anti-terrorism amendment limits

the exception to torture, extrajudicial killing (as such terms
are defined in the Torture Victim Protection Act), aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or61"the provision of material support or
resources" for such acts.
The passage of these two FSIA amendments, in particular
the anti-terrorism amendment, marked a departure from the
57. Id. at 10 (testimony ofJamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, Dep't
of State).
58. See id. at 22 (testimony of Sen. Arlen Spencer).
59. Id. at 22-23 (testimony of Sen. Arlen Specter). For a discussion of
universal jurisdiction and how it relates to the anti-terrorism amendment,
see Part IV.B.
60. See id. at 26-30 (excerpting the text of S.825).
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (7) (Supp. V 1999). In order to create a cause
of action for state-sponsored terrorism under United States law, Congress
enacted a separate amendment to the FSIA, the Civil Liability for Acts of
State Sponsored Terrorism, commonly known as the Flatow Amendment.
See Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-121, 3009-172 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1605). The Flatow Amendment, which allows for the recovery of
compensatory as well as punitive damages, is named in honor of Alisa
Flatow, a victim of terrorism and the subject of one of the first cases to apply
the anti-terrorism amendment. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.
Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998). For a discussion of the Flatow Amendment, see Warren D. Zaffuto, Comment, A "Pirate'sVictory" President Clinton's Approach to
the New FSIA Exception Leaves the Victors Empty-Handed, 74 TUL. L. REv. 685,
698-700 (1999).
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approach of the 1976 statute, which consciously limited the
territorial scope of the FSIA exceptions. During the initial
years of the FSIA's existence, there was relatively little tension
between the statute's extraterritorial reach and U.S. constitutional constraints on personal jurisdiction. After passage of
the arbitration amendment, however, a Mongolian stateowned enterprise that agreed to arbitration in Japan might be
brought into U.S. court to enforce the award. After passage of
the anti-terrorism amendment, a "rogue" state such as Iran
might be sued in an action in U.S. court for aiding and abetting hostage taking or aircraft sabotage occurring in Europe.
In addition, broad judicial interpretations of the commercial
activity exception 62 and the expropriation exception 63 have
created tension between the "minimum contacts" requirement
and exceptions to immunity under the original 1976 statute.
Assuming an exception to immunity under the statute applies,
the constitutional issue in each of these examples is whether
the foreign state can raise lack of "minimum contacts" as a defense to jurisdiction.
C.

"Minimum Contacts"

In the United States, federal circuit and district courts until recently have held that a foreign state is entitled to due process. Due process in this context refers to the protections established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, i.e., that a
court may not assert jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant unless that sovereign possesses "minimum contacts"
with the forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "64 Since Pennoyer v. Neff the Supreme Court has held
that this is a constitutional right, protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 5
62. For a discussion of the commercial activity exception, see Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992); supra note 38 and accompanying
text; and infra Part IV.A.
63. See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal.
2001); see also supra pp. 115-16.
64. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
65. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). Of course, where a foreign sovereign defendant is involved, the Due Process Clause that is implicated is that of the Fifth Amendment, since the FSIA provides that any suit
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As it has evolved through successive interpretations by the
Supreme Court, the "minimum contacts" test entails a two-step
inquiry. First, the defendant's contacts with the forum must
be such that the defendant reasonably could anticipate defending there. 66 In other words, a court will look for some
activity by which the defendant has "purposefully availed itself
of the privileges and benefits of the laws of the United
States."' 67 Second, the assertion of jurisdiction should not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Thus, a court also must consider whether asserting jurisdiction
is reasonable. As the Supreme Court stated in World-Wide Volkswagen, assessing reasonableness entails weighing a number of
factors, including the burden on the defendant, the forum's
interest in adjudicating, the plaintiffs interest in suing in the
6
forum, judicial efficiency, and other policy considerations.
As to the application of the "minimum contacts" test to a
foreign state, there are a few aspects of the test that are worth
attention. First, when measuring a foreign state's contacts with
a given forum, may the court consider aggregate contacts with
the entire United States, or is the court restricted to considering contacts with the forum state? The prevailing view is that
States. 69
the relevant contacts are those with the entire United
against a foreign sovereign will be heard in federal court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1330 (1976). For a discussion of Pennoyer, see infra Part III.B.
66. See Mary Kay Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34
Corp. v.
STAN. L. REV. 385, 404-05 (1983) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
67. Id. at 405 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
Judge Posner explains the policy behind the "purposeful availment" requirement from a cost-benefit perspective: "the defendant must derive some benefit from the state to balance the cost of exposure to suit in what is likely to
be an inconvenient, perhaps even an unfriendly, forum." Afram Exp. Corp.
v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1985).
68. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Kane, supra note 66 (citing
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292); cf. Allen R. Kamp, Beyond Minimum
Contacts: The Supreme Court's New Jurisdictional Theory, 15 GA. L. REV. 19
(1980) (explaining that World-Wide Volkswagen and related cases represent a
shift towards greater emphasis on state sovereignty concerns in personal jurisdiction).
69. In Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314 (2d
Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit held that, given the special service of process
provision in the FSIA (similar to the securities and antitrust statutes, providing for worldwide service of process), the relevant area in finding contacts is
the entire United States, as opposed to just the State of New York. Professor
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For example, if a Texas court were assessing the constitutionality of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant,
the relevant contacts to consider would be those with the
United States as a whole, not merely those with Texas.
Another factor to consider is the difference between general and specific jurisdiction. 70 Specific jurisdiction refers to
the basis for jurisdiction when a controversy arises out of the
defendant's contacts with the forum state. 7 1 When jurisdiction
over a defendant is found on the basis of the defendant's contacts with the forum that are unrelated to the cause of action,
the state is exercising "general jurisdiction. '72 Under general
jurisdiction, a court might find "minimum contacts" based
upon a defendant's activity in the forum state that has nothing
to do with the lawsuit. However, in Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Supreme Court held that the level of
contacts necessary to exercise general jurisdiction had to be
"continuous and systematic" in order to satisfy due process. 73
Kane takes this position as well, citing the Texas Tradingcase. See Kane, supra
note 66, at 405; see also Ronan E. Degnan and Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of
Jurisdictionover and Enforcement ofJudgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HAsTINGS LJ. 799, 815 (1988). See also Antoine v. Atlas Turner Inc., 66 F.3d 105
(6th Cir. 1995); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.
1987). But see Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev., 213 F.3d 841, 854 (5th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 426 (2000) (considering only foreign sovereign's contacts with state of Texas).
70. The concepts of "general jurisdiction" and "specific jurisdiction"
were first defined and analyzed in Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv.
1121, 1136-63 (1966).
71. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 (1984) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
72. Id. at 414 n.9. Typically, general jurisdiction is premised on defendant's residence within the state. See Friedrich Juenger, JudicialJurisdictionin
the United States and in the European Communities: A Comparison, 82 MICH. L.
REv. 1195, 1203 (1984) (discussing the Justinian Code and the Supreme
Court's recognition of general jurisdiction in Milliken v. Meyer). The Draft
Hague Convention on Foreign Judgments provides that a defendant may be
sued in courts of the state where defendant is "habitually resident." See Draft
Hague Convention, supra note 19; see also infra note 291 and accompanying
text.
73. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415-16. In Helicopteros, the defendant was a
Colombian operator of a helicopter that crashed in Peru, killing the U.S.
plaintiffs on board. Although the chief executive officer of Helicol had conducted negotiations in connection with the contract in Houston, and although the company had accepted payment from a Houston bank, had pur-
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In the context of suits under the FSIA, the issue has been
raised as to whether a foreign state's presence in the United
States through an embassy or consulate would suffice for pur74
If the existence of an
poses of finding general jurisdiction.
over a forjurisdiction
assert
to
sufficient
were
alone
embassy
state is a
foreign
a
whether
of
question
the
then
eign state,
"person" for due process purposes would be moot for the vast
majority of countries, 75 since contacts with the United States
sufficient to satisfy due process could be found in any event.
In fact, while the existence of an embassy or a foreign state's
chamber of commerce has been cited by courts as relevant to
finding "minimum contacts," in those cases where jurisdiction
was found, it was on the basis of specific jurisdiction or the

76
existence of other contacts that related to the suit. In other

words, these cases do not stand for the idea that an embassy or

chased helicopters from Texas, and had sent employees to Texas for training, this did not amount to "continuous and systematic contacts" sufficient
to assert jurisdiction over Helicopteros in a wrongful death action in Texas
court. See generally id.
DavidJ. Bederman, Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sov74. See, e.g.,
ereign Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
255, 275 (1995) (citing cases, but stating that the issue of applying general
jurisdiction to foreign sovereign defendants is "still open"); Adam C. Belsky
et al., Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A ProposedException to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of InternationalLaw, 77 CAL.L. REv. 365, 408 (1989)
(arguing that the activities of a foreign state's embassy or tourist promotion
agency would provide sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction).
75. As of January 2001, the number of independent states in the world
(not including Taiwan) totaled 191. Of these, the United States enjoyed
diplomatic relations with all but five: Bhutan, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North
Korea. See U.S. State Dep't, Independent States in the World, at http://www.
state.gov/www/regions/independent states.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2002).
76. See, e.g., Olsen v. Republic of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1984)
(discussing general jurisdiction but finding contacts on the basis of specific
jurisdiction); Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic,
690 F. Supp. 682 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (findingjurisdiction based on the commercial activity exception in a suit to enforce payment for medical services provided in the United States, where payment was arranged through a U.S.
bank); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 628 F. Supp. 599 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(finding jurisdiction based on the commercial activity exception in a suit to
enforce sovereign's obligation to pay dollar-denominated commission to
U.S. plaintiff at bank of plaintiff's choosing); cf El-Hadad v. United Arab
Emirates, 69 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 216 F.3d 29
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding jurisdiction based on the commercial activity exception in a suit to enforce employment contract by an embassy employee
who was fired).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics

INTJERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 34:115

consulate alone is enough to find general jurisdiction over a
foreign sovereign defendant. 77 Conversely, in other FSIA
cases, courts have found that "minimum contacts" were insufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the foreign state had established an embassy in the United States. 78 These decisions
seem correct, for even where a foreign state has a "continuous
and systematic" presence in the United States through an embassy or consulate, it is questionable whether exercising jurisdiction over that state in connection with an unrelated matter
would satisfy "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
79
justice."
D.

Texas Trading

Although the exceptions to immunity outlined in the
FSLA incorporate a jurisdictional nexus, courts applying the
statute traditionally have employed a "minimum contacts" test
in addition to the statutory test. The decision that generally is
credited for the proposition that an exercise of jurisdiction
under the FSIA must satisfy due process is Texas Tradingv. Federal Republic of Nigeria.80 This case, in the words of the Second
77. One case that seemed to base general jurisdiction on an embassy
presence alone was later vacated. See Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 251 n.3 (D.D.C. 1985) (finding minimum contacts are "clearly satisfied" since the Soviet Union "maintains a substantial
presence in this District"), vacated, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990).
78. See, e.g.,
Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (dismissing the case for lack of "minimum contacts," no discussion of Qatar's presence in the United States through its embassy);
L'Europeene de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same, with respect to Venezuela).
79. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)), cited in Bederman, supra note 74,
at 275. An analogy can be drawn to a line of cases from the District of Columbia establishing the "government contacts" exception to personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., World Wide Minerals v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 98, 105 (D.D.C. 2000); Mallinckrodt Med., Inc. v. Sonus Pharm.,
Inc., 989 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D.D.C. 1998). Because of the importance of
citizens retaining unfettered access to petition the federal government, these
decisions hold that a defendant's contacts with U.S. government instrumentalities in the District of Columbia (e.g., filing an application with a government agency or petitioning Congress) are not relevant for purposes of finding minimum contacts. See Mallinckrodt, 989 F. Supp. at 271.
80. Tex. Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.
1981).
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Circuit, arose out of "one of the most enormous commercial
1
disputes in history."8 In the mid-1970s, the Nigerian government entered into 109 contracts for the purchase of more
than sixteen million metric tons of cement from suppliers
around the world at an aggregate price of close to one billion
dollars.8 2 The government ordered the cement to meet pressing demands to build the country's infrastructure in response
to an oil-export driven economic boom. The government oranticipating that most of
dered more cement than it needed,
8 3 When suppliers flooded the
the suppliers would default.
docks of Nigeria with massive cement shipments, the government sought to back out of most of its commitments. Four of
the suppliers brought suit against Nigeria in New York court
for breach of contract. Nigeria raised the defense of sovereign
immunity.
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the commercial
activity exception to the FSIA applied. Since payment for the
cement was arranged through a New York bank and since each
of the plaintiff suppliers was a United States company, Nigeria's failure to pay for the cement caused a "direct effect" in
4
the United States. 8 In interpreting the FSIA, however, the
court also held that, in order to find personal jurisdiction
under the statute, Nigeria must be shown to have had "minimum contacts" with the United States: "[The FSIA] cannot
create personal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it.
Accordingly, each finding of personal jurisdiction under the
The
FSIA requires, in addition, a due process scrutiny .... "85
case,
this
in
met
was
test
constitutional
court found that the
since (among other things) Nigeria had issued letters of credit
6
in payment for the cement under the contracts through a New
relationship.
York bank with which it had a longstanding
While the Second Circuit in Texas Tradingposed the question of whether a foreign state is a "person" for purposes of the
Due Process Clause, it did not articulate a rationale for effectively answering that question in the affirmative. The court
81. Id. at 302.
82. Id. at 303.
83. Based on past experience, only about twenty percent of suppliers
were expected to be able to perform the contract. See id. at 305.
84. Id. at 312.
85. Id. at 308.
86. Id. at 314-15.
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did, however, rely on limited precedent for the idea that a
"minimum contacts" analysis is appropriate in an action
against a foreign state.8s7 In addition, the court addressed potential concerns raised with respect to asserting personal jurisdiction in an international context:
Like the states of our nation, the United States is a
member of an international community. While it has
not formally renounced part of its long-arm power by
signing an international constitution, considerations
of fairness nonetheless regulate every exercise of the
federal judicial machinery.... The analogy between
the national and international systems may not be
sufficiently exact to lead to the same result in every
case, but here we see no reason to stray from our former adherence to the analysis developed under the
Fourteenth Amendment.8 8
Notwithstanding any differences between a foreign and a
domestic defendant, or between a sovereign state and a private
person, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, the court in
Texas Tradingfound no compelling reason to treat a foreign
state differently from other persons in the constitutional
framework. In particular, the court reasoned that the commercial branch of a foreign state should be subject to the same
jurisdictional test as that applicable to a foreign corporation.8 9
Texas Trading is the leading case for the idea that a foreign state is a "person" for personal jurisdiction purposes. 9 0
For almost ten years following the Second Circuit's ruling in
Texas Trading,courts applying the FSIA generally assumed that
a due process scrutiny is necessary in order to find personal
jurisdiction over foreign states. As the following section ex87. See, e.g., Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion
de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that minimum contacts did not exist and therefore not reaching the question of whether the
FSIA applied); Purdy Co. v. Argentina, 333 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1964) (stating, pre-FSIA, that minimum contacts are "essential to a valid assertion of
extra-territorial assertion of jurisdiction").
88. Tex. Trading, 647 F.2d at 316 n.37; see also supra note 39.
89. See Tex. Trading, 647 F.2d at 316.
90. See, e.g., Glannon & Atik, supra note 48, at 682 (referring to Texas

Trading as the "seminal case" on this issue); Peter D. Trooboff, Foreign State
RECEUIL DES CouPs 235, 33738 (1986 V).
Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles,200
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plains, this assumption has been called into question. However, while a foreign state may not be a "person" for due process purposes, international law nonetheless constrains the assertion of jurisdiction to adjudicate over a foreign state and
provides a tool for interpreting the FSIA exceptions.
III.

FOREIGN STATES, DUE PROCESS, AND

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A.

ConstitutionalStatus of Foreign States

The question of whether a foreign state may be entitled to

claim the constitutional protections of due process is a difficult
one. Where, for example, the sovereign defendant is a stateowned company engaged in international commerce, the state
is acting like a private person and reason suggests that the
state in such a case should be subject to the same jurisdictional
rules as a private person. On the other hand, to the limited
extent that this issue has been analyzed, both international law
experts and judges have taken the view that foreign states
stand outside of the constitutional structure and, as such, are
not entitled to assert constitutional rights. This is especially
true where a foreign state attempts to challenge an act of Congress or the executive branch on constitutional grounds.
Although the status of a foreign state for due process purposes is unclear, the Supreme Court has ruled on related issues, and particularly on the status of aliens and foreign corporations9 ' within the U.S. constitutional structure. As for the
applicability of the "minimum contacts" test to foreign corporations, it is well settled that foreign corporations are entitled
to due process, although the rationale for this has not been
elaborated. Consider, for example, Judge Posner's observation in Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A. that, although "countless cases assume" that foreign companies are
entitled to due process protection with respect to assertions of
personal jurisdiction, the assumption has never been ex91. Of course, the Supreme Court has long adopted the legal fiction that
a corporation is a "person" for jurisdictional as well as other purposes. For a
discussion of the philosophical background and linguistic basis for treating a
corporation as a person, along with an historic overview of the Supreme

Court's views on corporate personality, see Sanford A. Shane, The Corporation
Is a Person: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 61 TUL. L. Riv. 563 (1987).
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amined. 92 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held (on at least
two occasions) that an assertion of personal jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation exceeded the limits of due process without explicitly addressing the threshold question of whether a
foreign corporation is entitled to due process. 93 Thus it is
fairly clear that a foreign corporation is a "person" for due process purposes, although the rationale for this proposition has
gone unexplained.
On the other hand, it is also clear that aliens are not entitled to the same level of Constitutional protection as U.S. citizens. Although the Supreme Court has held that an alien is
entitled to constitutional protection, 94 and in some contexts is
even a "person" for purposes of due process, 95 the scope of
such protection is narrower than that afforded citizens, especially where immigration status is at issue. 96 Furthermore,
when alleged violations of constitutional rights have occurred
against aliens outside of the United States, the Supreme Court
has been unwilling to extend constitutional protection extraterritorially.9 7 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme
92. Afram Exp. Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1362
(7th Cir. 1985).
93. SeeAsahi v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
94. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (finding that
state statutes that deny welfare benefits to certain aliens violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally 1 LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 973-77 (3d ed. 2000).
95. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding that
Civil Service Commission regulation excluding non-U.S. citizens from employment violates due process under the Fifth Amendment).
96. See TRIBE, supra note 94, at 973 ("[T]he Court has consistently held
that the substantive requirements an alien must meet to enter this country,
to remain here, or to become a citizen, are virtually political questions, matters within the discretion of Congress and outside the scope of all but the
most limited judicial review."); cf. Zavydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)
(holding that illegal aliens are entitled to raise constitutional challenges relating to post-removal detention proceedings).
97. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(holding that a warrantless search conducted by the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency in Mexico was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment since the
search was conducted against an alien outside of U.S. territory; aliens receive
constitutional protections only when they have "developed substantial connections" with the United States); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1949) (finding that German nationals who were convicted of war crimes
and detained by U.S. authorities abroad were not entitled to constitutional
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Court upheld such a territorial approach to constitutional
rights by reasoning that U.S. dealings outside of its borders
generally are governed not by the Constitution but by international agreements and principles of international law. 98 At
one level, the line of cases that hold that foreign corporations
are entitled to due process for purposes of personal jurisdiction is in conflict with cases such as Verdugo-Urquidez, which
deny constitutional protections to aliens outside of U.S. territory. The two lines of cases could be reconciled, however, if
the issue of personal jurisdiction (at least as it relates to alien
defendants) were treated as a limitation on U.S. sovereignty,
distinct from other constitutional rights. 99
Compared with that of aliens and foreign corporations,
the status of the foreign state raises additional difficulties both
because of foreign policy considerations and the foreign
state's relationship to the U.S. constitutional scheme. 100 With
one exception (discussed below), the question has received little attention by scholars andjudges. The Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law makes only a passing reference to
this issue. 10 1 However, the chief reporter for the Restatement,
protections); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it
have any force in foreign territory except in respect of our own citizens."); cf.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (finding that U.S. citizens who were convicted of murder by U.S. military tribunals abroad were entitled to the constitutional rights of due process and trial by jury); Zavydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct.
2491, 2500 (2001) ("[O]nce an alien enters the country... the Due Process
Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens.").
Gary Haugen observes that, if the reasoning of Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, were applied to the personal jurisdiction due process context, the
bizarre result would be that such aliens would be entitled only to the "minimum contacts" requirement once the alien established "substantial connections" with the United States. See Gary A. Haugen, PersonalJurisdiction and
Due Process Rights for Alien Defendants, 11 B.U. INT'L LJ. 109, 115-16 (1993).
98. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
99. See infra Part III.B.
100. As Lori Fisler Damrosch observes, "[t]o the extent that the Constitution is a social contract establishing a system of self government, permanent
outsiders such as foreign states seem to have little claim to invoke constitutional 'rights."' Lori Fisler Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73
VA. L. REv. 483, 487 (1987).
101. The Restatement (Third) commentary states (without citation) that,
although a foreign state has been held not to be a person for purposes of
due process, "it was apparently the intention of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act that foreign states be treated like private entities for the pur-
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Professor Henkin, has asserted elsewhere that foreign states
10 2
simply "have no constitutional rights" in the United States.
Professor Henkin does not elaborate on the reasoning for
his conclusion, but in a detailed and nuanced analysis of foreign states' status in the U.S. constitutional system, Professor
Damrosch argues that constitutional claims against the actions
of the federal political branches must fail because of the relationship of foreign states to the federal structure. Damrosch
also suggests, however, that where there is no conflict with the
legislative or executive branch, application of constitutional
norms may be appropriate:
To the extent that the Constitution is a social contract establishing a system of self-government, permanent outsiders such as foreign states seem to have little claim to invoke constitutional "rights" against domestic political decisions .

. .

When, on the other

hand, a claim does not directly confront or conflict
with the political branches' foreign policy, the federal courts should adjudicate the merits of foreign
state claims by applying constitutional jurisprudence
04
to sustain or reject the claim.'
Applying this analysis to the FSIA, Professor Damrosch
concludes that the FSIA's jurisdictional nexus language ensures that any case that satisfies the statutory requirements also
pose of determining the necessary connection with the forum."
MENT (THIRD),

RESTATE-

supra note 39, § 453 (Reporters' Note 3). Thus, the Restate-

ment commentary suggests that existing limits on personal jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns is a function of statutory intent rather than constitutional
right.
102. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 293 (2d ed. 1996). In support of this proposition, Henkin cites a
series of cases, involving Fourth Amendment challenges against wiretapping
foreign intelligence, and Professor Damrosch's article. See Damrosch, supra
note 100.
103. See Damrosch, supra note 100, at 487.
104. Id. at 489. Note that the approach proposed by this article is consistent with Damrosch's in terms of practical result. Under the approach taken
by this article, similar to Damrosch's analysis, principles of international law
yield to acts of Congress, although the two should be construed consistently
wherever possible. See infra Part III.C (discussing the international origins of
jurisdiction). The difference is that my approach relies on international law
rules of jurisdiction.
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will meet the constitutional requirement; 10 5 however, if Congress were to direct that a foreign state be subject to suit, that
state should not be entitled to resort to constitutional arguments to challenge jurisdiction.10 6
An interesting application of Damrosch's ideas is the
opinion in Mendelsohn v. Meese.10 7 In the case, a group of individuals and organizations, including officials of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), challenged the constitutionality of the Anti-terrorism Act of 1987, which prohibited giving
to or receiving from the PLO anything of value or establishing
or maintaining an office or other facility of the PLO on United

States territory. In response to the PLO's argument that the
act violated the First Amendment, the court quoted
Damrosch's article and held that, just as a foreign state lies
outside of the U.S. constitutional system,
[t] he same is true of the PLO, an organization whose
status, while uncertain, lies outside the constitutional
system. It has never undertaken to abide by United
States law or to "accept the constitutional plan." No
foreign entity of its nature could be expected to do
SO.

10 8

The court concluded that the PLO, due to its status as an
outsider to the U.S. constitutional structure, was not entitled
to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. 10 9 Although Mendelsohn deals with the status of a political organization and not
a state, the analogy to a foreign state is very close.
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the
question of whether a foreign state is a "person" for purposes
of the Due Process Clause, the Court has answered that question in the negative with respect to constitutional challenges
105. Damrosch, supra note 100, at 500. Note that Damrosch's article was
published in 1987, prior to the adoption of the FSIA amendments.
106. See id. at 501-03. See also Glannon & Atik, supra note 48, at 695 (applying Damrosch's analysis to the anti-terrorism amendment and concluding
that a minimum contacts analysis is not appropriate in such a context, since
the anti-terrorism amendment is exactly the sort of expression of political
intent that Damrosch was referring to); Caplan, supra note 48, at 398-401
(listing legal and policy arguments against treating foreign states as "persons").
107. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

108. Id. at 1481.
109. See id.
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by state government. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the state
of South Carolina brought suit seeking a declaration that the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 was unconstitutional.' 1 0 In particular, South Carolina alleged that the Act violated due process by
precluding judicial review of administrative findings, providing for an expedited challenge procedure, and limiting litigation to a distant forum.11 1 The Supreme Court dismissed
these arguments summarily by stating, without elaboration,
that "[t] he word 'person' .

cannot, by any reasonable mode

of interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the
Union ..... 112 This aspect of the holding in Katzenbach has
been cited by lower courts to defeat due process challenges by
a state agency, 11 3 a municipality, 1 4 and a foreign mission es1 15
tablished by the PLO.
Notwithstanding this line of precedent, when it comes to
the question of due process as it relates to personal jurisdiction, courts until recently have not questioned whether foreign sovereign defendants were entitled to due process. Instead, they either have followed the approach of Texas Trading
or simply have applied the jurisdictional nexus requirements
set forth in the FSIA without conducting a separate constitutional analysis. The idea that a foreign state is entitled to due
process first was called into question in 1992 when the Supreme Court decided Republic of Argentina v. Weltover.116 This
case arose out of a breach of a dollar-denominated sovereign
debt obligation issued by the Argentine Central Bank. The
terms of the obligation entitled bondholders to collect pay110. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
111. See id. at 323.
112. Id.
113. See Premo v. Martin, 119 F.3d 764, 771 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding
arbitration award issued by a federally-convened panel against the California
Department of Rehabilitation).
114. SeeEast St. Louis v. Circuit Court, 986 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1993)
(rejecting a municipality's constitutional challenge of a writ of execution issued by an Illinois state court conveying the East St. Louis City Hall to satisfy
judgment).
115. See Palestine Info. Office v. Schultz, 674 F. Supp. 910, 919 (D.C. Cir.
1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 932 (D.D.C. 1988) (rejecting the due process challenge
of an order issued to the PLO by the U.S. State Department to cease operations).
116. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
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ment either in Frankfurt, Zurich, or New York. 117 Swiss and
Panamanian bondholders elected payment in New York and
brought suit in U.S. court to collect on the obligation. Argentina argued that the commercial activity exception of the FSIA
did not apply since the bond issuance (and its breach) was
part of a sovereign debt restructuring and, in any event, did
not have the necessary jurisdictional nexus with the United
States. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that the activity was commercial and that, notwithstanding the fact that
both the debtor and the bondholders were foreign, there was
a sufficient jurisdictional nexus with the United States since
the bondholders elected for payment in New York. 118 In other
words, because of Argentina's failure to pay, "[m] oney that was
supposed to have been delivered to a New York bank for deposit was not forthcoming."' 19
In response to Argentina's due process challenge, the
Court found that Argentina possessed the "minimum contacts"
with the United States necessary to satisfy the constitutional
test-the debt obligation was dollar-denominated and payable
in New York, and Argentina had appointed a financial agent
for service of process. 120 In dicta, however, Justice Scalia
seemed to question the necessity of conducting such a test.
He cited Katzenbach for the proposition that U.S. states are not
"persons" for purposes of the Due Process Clause and stated
that the Court was "[a] ssuming, without deciding" that Argentina was entitled to due process. 121 Since Weltover, several circuit courts have questioned whether foreign states are entitled
to due process, and several district courts have held that they
12 2
are not.
The academic commentary and case law summarized
above suggest that, if and when the Supreme Court addresses
the question, it will hold that a foreign state is not a "person"
for purposes of the Due Process Clause. This proposition may
be correct as a policy matter, and it certainly is a legal position
that is consistent with precedent. At the same time, it seems
117. See id. at 609-10.
118. See id. at 619.

119. Id.
120. See id. at 619-20.

121. Id.
122. See discussion of the anti-terrorism amendment and related case law,
supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
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absurd to suggest that the rules of jurisdiction do not apply
simply because a foreign state is not entitled to raise constitutional claims. There is another basis on which to limit personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant in U.S.
court-the norms of international law. In fact, limitations on
personal jurisdiction can be traced back beyond the Fourteenth Amendment (as courts generally have held since Pennoyer v. Neff1 23 ) to ancient principles of Roman law.

B.

PersonalJurisdiction Before and Immediately After Pennoyer

This section describes the influence that international law
has exerted on the development of the law of personal jurisdiction in the United States. It demonstrates that the origins
of the law of personal jurisdiction in the United States derive
from conflicts doctrine and international law. Even if a foreign state is found not to be a "person" for purposes of the
Due Process Clause, a U.S. court cannot operate in a vacuum;
as discussed below, international law still constrains U.S.
courts' exercise of jurisdiction.
It is worth noting at the outset that it is not universal practice for jurisdictional rules to be given constitutional status.
European jurisdictional rules, for example, generally are contained not in a country's constitution but in its code of civil
procedure. 1 24 Although the U.S. modern approach to per-

sonal jurisdiction comes from InternationalShoe, the idea that
limits on personal jurisdiction are protected by the Constitution was espoused first by Justice Field almost seventy years earlier, in the famous old case Pennoyer v. Neff. 125 The issue in the
case was the validity of a prior default judgment issued by an
123. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
124. See Henry P. deVries and Andreas F. Lowenfeld,Jurisdiction in Personal
Actions-A Comparison of Civil Law Views, 44 IowA L. REV. 306, 316 n.40, 330
(1959) (pointing out that French and German rules of jurisdiction are contained in each country's respective Code of Civil Procedure). Switzerland is

an exception. Its constitution contains a provision guaranteeing that any
solvent debtor domiciled in Switzerland may be sued only in the canton of
its domicile. See id. at 308 (citing Article 59 of the Swiss Federal Constitution). Not having surveyed world practice on this issue, I cannot say for certain, but I have a hunch that the United States is in the minority ofjurisdictions that afford constitutional status to the rules of personal jurisdiction.
125. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Oregon court against Neff, a resident of California. The judgment was executed through the sale of a tract of land Neff
owned in Oregon, and Neff brought an action in federal court
to recover possession of his property.
The Supreme Court held that the Oregon judgment was
void for lack of personal jurisdiction, emphasizing the "exclusive jurisdiction" that each state has over persons and property
within its boundaries.1 26 Since Neff was a resident of California, the Oregon court's judgment, obtained without personal
service upon him, amounted to an invalid "encroachment" on
the independence of California. 127 What is particularly relevant for our purposes is Justice Field's assertion that this territorial limitation on jurisdiction is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment:
Whatever difficulty may be experienced in giving to
[the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] a definition which will embrace every permissible exertion of power affecting private rights . . .
there can be no doubt of [its] meaning when applied
to judicial proceedings.... To give such proceedings
any validity, there must be a tribunal... to pass upon
the subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves
merely a determination of the personal liability of the
defendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction
by service of process within the State, or his voluntary
appearance.128

As an interpretive matter, one wonders whether the drafters of
the Fourteenth Amendment truly meant for "due process" to
encompass territorial limits on personal jurisdiction (in addition to notice and the opportunity to be heard).129 Whether
126. Id. at 722. The Court also suggested that, although the Oregon court
in this case had proceeded by attempting to obtain personal jurisdiction

over Neff, the Oregon court might have obtained in rem jurisdiction by attaching Neffs property and proceeding on that basis. See id. at 727-28.
127. Id. at 723.

128. Id. at 733.
129. See generally Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on StateCourt Jurisdiction: A Historical-InterpretiveReexamination of the Full Faith and

Credit and Due Process Clauses: Part 2, 14

CREIGHTON

L. Rv. 735 (1980-81)

(demonstrating that, prior to Pennoyer, "due process" was not understood

commonly to encompass territorial limits on jurisdiction); see also Harold L.
Korn, The Development of JudicialJurisdiction in the United States: Part 1, 65
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or not that was the original intent, however, Pennoyer firmly
established the notion that, under U.S. law, personal jurisdiction over defendants is protected by the Due Process
Clause.

130

Looking at Pennoyer itself, Justice Field's analysis of personal jurisdiction relies heavily on international law notions of
territorial limits on sovereignty, 13 1 in particular, Justice Joseph
Story's celebrated treatise on conflict of laws. 132 Justice Story's
treatise was considered the definitive work on the topic; it was
described by one scholar as being not only the first Englishlanguage treatise on the topic worthy of the name, but also
one whose influence on legal thinking during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries "can scarcely be overestimated."'13 3 Professor Hazard described the tremendous impact of Justice Story's thinking on the Pennoyer opinion:
There is no question ... that Story influenced Pennoyer v. Neff itself. The basic organization, the intellectual structure, and much of the language ofJustice
Field's opinion is taken straight from Story, with the
consequence that all the logical and practical difficul-

L. REV. 935, 983 (1999) (noting that Pennoyer, "by using the word
'process' in this double sense, conflated the notice and nexus elements of
jurisdiction in a single, conceptually indivisible phrase").
130. This was the case particularly after the Court reaffirmed this principle in InternationalShoe. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). See also discussion of Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), infra
notes 148-50.
131. Numerous commentators on the Pennoyer decision have made this
observation. See, e.g.,
Degnan & Kane, supra note 69, at 814-15; Korn, supra
note 129, at 977-82; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction,1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 260-65.
132. SeeJOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed.
1883). In contrast with public international law, conflicts doctrine addresses
the differences between the "private" laws-such as contract, tort, and property-of different states; it attempts to reconcile these differences by determining which jurisdiction's law is to govern in a particular case. As Harold
Korn describes it, conflict of laws embraces three sub-topics: judicial jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. See Korn, supra note 129, at 954. Europeans refer to the subject of
conflict of laws by the term "private international law."
133. Hessel E. Yntema, The HistoricBases of Private InternationalLaw, 2 AM.
J. COMp. L. 297, 307 (1953).
BROOK.
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were translated wholeties implicit in Story's system
13
sale into constitutional law. "
While Hazard and other commentators have criticized the way
in which Story distorted the European authorities that he cited
in his work, 13 5 the underlying fact, that Story's pronouncements on sovereignty and limits on extraterritorial assertions
of jurisdiction formed the basis of Justice Field's ruling in Pennoyer, remains unchallenged.1

36

For a full century before Pennoyer, United States courts
ruled on jurisdictional questions. These opinions also drew on
international law 13 7 and on the law of the European continent,

134. Hazard, supra note 131, at 262.
135. See id. at 258-60 (describing how Justice Story embellished on the
writings of the Dutch jurist Huber). What is ironic is that Story, the renowned expert of his day on conflicts law, allowed theory to overcome
pragmatics in restating the works of continental theorists onjurisdiction. As
Professor Juenger observes, Story relied on metaphysics and "deduced jurisdiction from mystical notions of sovereignty and territoriality." Friedrich K.
Juenger, American Jurisdiction:A Story of Comparative Neglect, 65 U. COLO. L.
REv. 1, 5 (1993) [hereinafterJuenger, AmericanJurisdiction]. The more pragmatic approach to jurisdiction-basing jurisdiction on the defendant's relationship with the forum through a scheme of general and specific jurisdiction-was a feature of Roman law dating back to the time of Justinian, but
did not figure into Story's scheme. See id.
A number of commentators have argued that the European approach
to personal jurisdiction is preferable to the U.S. approach. See Juenger,
American Jurisdiction,supra,at 19 (arguing that with the adoption of the Brussels Convention, see infra note 289, European jurisdictional law works with
"far greater efficiency" than the U.S. approach). See also Kevin M. Clermont,
JurisdictionalSalvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 89 (1999)
(arguing that the "United States' law of territorial jurisdiction in civil cases is
a mess," and advocating that Congress adopt as domestic law the jurisdictional rules of the Draft Hague Convention); Friedrich K.Juenger, A Hague
Judgments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111, 117 (1998) (discussing negotiations to the Draft Hague Convention and noting that "American jurisdictional law is simply not fit for export").
136. To give one concrete example, in Pennoyer,Justice Field cited Justice
Story for the proposition that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory." Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). This language was taken almost verbatim from
Story's treatise, from the chapter entitled "General Maxims of International
Jurisprudence." Justice Story wrote that "no state or nation can by its laws
directly affect or bind property out of its own territory, or bind persons not
resident therein." STORY, supra note 132, at 22.
137. See Hazard, supra note 131, at 258; Roger H. Transgrud, The Federal
Common Law of PersonalJurisdiction,57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 849, 871-73 (1989)
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since English courts had not developed conflicts law principles
until at least the early nineteenth century. 138 At the time, U.S.
courts were more receptive than they are now to comparative
approaches to deciding cases-counsel during the 1800s routinely cited to civil law as well as common law sources. 13 9 A
particularly salient issue during the years leading to Pennoyer
was territorial jurisdiction among the states in the context of
interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause.' 40 In resolving
this issue, the Supreme Court consistently relied on international law, in particular Story's notions of territoriality derived
from European authorities.
The first of these cases is Mills v. Duryee, where the Supreme Court in effect held that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause (and the legislation Congress passed in 1790 to implement it) 141 requires a state to recognize and enforce a sister
state judgment without inquiring into whether the sister state
had jurisdiction over the defendant. 142 Justice Johnson dissented. He argued that such an interpretation would undermine the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in promoting unity among the states. 143 Almost forty years later in
(arguing that the original common law rules were based on territorial rules
derived from the Law of Nations).
138. Consider this excerpt from the preface of the 1834 edition of Story's
treatise:
I am not aware that the works of these eminent [continental European] jurists have been cited at the English bar; and I should draw
the conclusion that they are in a great measure, if not altogether,
unknown to the studies of Westminster Hall. How it should happen that, in this age, English lawyers should be so utterly indifferent to all foreign jurisprudence, it is not easy to conceive.
STORY, supra note 132, at xii. Hazard suggests that until about 1830 there
was no developed English case law on interstate jurisdiction. See Hazard,
supra note 131, at 253. Korn explains that, since until about the early eighteenth century, English courts entertained no cases with foreign parties and
applied only English law, there was no need for conflicts doctrine. Notions
of territoriality only applied to internal administrative matters, such as the
reach of a local officer's authority to serve process. See Korn, supra note 129,
at 986-87.
139. SeeJuenger, American Jurisdiction,supra note 135 , at 5.
140. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
141. Full Faith and Credit Implementing Act of 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 192,
cited in Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 483-84 (1813).
142. Mills, 11 U.S. at 481.
143. Justice Johnson supported his jurisdictional arguments by reference
to "eternal principles" ofjustice:
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14 7

For a time after Pennoyer was decided, the Supreme Court
seemed to retreat from the idea that limitations on jurisdiction
are protected by the Due Process Clause and turned to conflict
of laws principles instead. Milliken v. Meyer raised the issue of
Wyoming's jurisdiction over a defendant who lived in Wyoming but was absent from the state at the time of suit. 148 In

upholding jurisdiction, the Court affirmed Pennoyer's reliance
on the Due Process Clause, but only with respect to the requirement that service of process be adequate to meet, to use
the often-cited words, "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

1 49

As for the territorial limits of Wyoming's

jurisdiction, the Court found that jurisdiction was present due
There are certain eternal principles of justice, which never ought
to be dispensed with, and which courts of justice never can dispense with, but when compelled by positive statute. One of these

is, that jurisdiction cannot be justly exercised by a state over property not within the reach of its process, or over persons not owing

them allegiance, or not subjected to their jurisdiction, by being
found within their limits.

Id. at 486 (Johnson, J., dissenting). In fact, the "eternal principles" referred
to in Justice Johnson's dissent in Mills v. Duryee have been cited as the basis

for the dicta in Pennoyer that links personal jurisdiction to the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause
and the In PersonamJurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla, 25
U. CHi. L. REv. 569, 572 (1958) (observing that Pennoyds dicta read John-

son's "eternal principles" into the Due Process Clause).

144. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).

145. Id. at 176.

146. See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. 404, 406 (1855) (referring to
"rules of public law which protect persons and property within one State

from the exercise ofjurisdiction over them by another"); Hall v. Lanning, 91
U.S. 160, 168-69 (1875) (citing international law for the same idea).
147. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729 (1877).
148. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
149. Id. at 463.
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to the defendant's domicile in Wyoming. For this proposition,
the court relied not on the Due Process Clause but on the Restatement of Conflict of Laws. 1 50 Any doubt that Milliken may
have cast on the legal basis for personal jurisdiction, however,
was eliminated by InternationalShoe. In the very first sentence
of the opinion, Justice Stone framed the issue in the case as
whether the defendant was amenable to proceedings in Washington court "within the limitations of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

'1 5

1

Thus the Court in Interna-

tional Shoe expressly reaffirmed the aspect of Pennoyer that elevates personal jurisdiction to a constitutional right. 1 52
To summarize, before and even for some time after Pennoyer was decided, the Supreme Court found limits on personal jurisdiction to be governed by international law and conflict of laws principles. If the Court follows the Katzenbach approach and holds that a foreign state is not a "person" for due
process purposes, this will mean that the limits on personal
jurisdiction over foreign states will not have the status of a constitutional right. Legal limits on jurisdiction still exist, however, and, as the following section elaborates, the rules of personal jurisdiction under international law parallel Supreme
Court jurisprudence on "minimum contacts"-that is, the basic principles of each are very similar.
C.

Limits on Jurisdiction Under InternationalLaw

International law limits on assertions of jurisdiction to
prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce law still are based essentially
on territoriality and nationality. Professor Brownlie's treatise
on international law summarizes the essential principles limiting extraterritorial jurisdiction. Professor Brownlie states that
extraterritorial conduct may be subject to a state's jurisdiction
only under the following conditions:
150. See id. at 464. See also Korn, supra note 129, at 997 (stating that in
Milliken, Justice Douglas "recognized and overcame Pennoyeds unwarranted

conflation" of the notice aspect and the jurisdictional nexus aspect of due

process). The court in Milliken also cited to taxation cases that tie the enjoyment of the privileges and protections of a state to the state's right to exact
reciprocal duties. See Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463.
151. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945).
152. See Kurland, supra note 143, at 571 (commenting that the "eternal
principles" referred to byJustice Johnson in Mills v. Duryee formed the basis
for the Court's opinion in Pennoyer).
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(i) that there should be a substantial and bona fide
connection between the subject-matter and the
source of the jurisdiction;
(ii) that the principle of non-intervention in the domestic or territorial jurisdiction of other states should
be observed;
(iii) that a principle based on elements of accommodation, mutuality, and proportionality should be ap-

plied ....153
These principles recognize that any extraterritorial exercise of
jurisdiction potentially infringes on the sovereignty of another
state, and require that any such exercise be reasonable in light
of other states' legitimate interests in the dispute.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States first sets forth the general principle of international law that any extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction to
adjudicate must be reasonable and then lists specific instances
where such jurisdiction would be reasonable, including familiar factors such as presence of the defendant or property
within the territory, nationality or residence of the defendant,
the carrying out of regular activity by the defendant within the
154
These factors bear
state, and the consent of the defendant.
a striking resemblance to U.S. law on personal jurisdiction; in153. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 313 (5th ed.
1998).
154. Paragraph (2) of Restatement (Third) section 421 provides in full:
In general, a state's exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with re-

spect to a person or thing is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is
asserted:
(a) the person or thing is present in the territory of the state,
other than transitorily;

(b) the person, if a natural person, is domiciled in the state;
(c) the person, if a natural person, is resident in the state;
(d) the person, if a natural person, is a national of the state;
(e) the person, if a corporation or comparable juridical person,
is organized pursuant to the law of the state;
(f) a ship, aircraft or other vehicle to which the adjudication relates is registered under the laws of the state;

(g) the person, whether natural or juridical, has consented to
the exercise of jurisdiction;
(h) the person, whether natural or juridical, regularly carries on

business in the state;
(i) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on activ-

ity in the state, but only in respect of such activity;
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deed, the commentary to the Restatement rule observes that
the rules of jurisdiction to adjudicate under international law
are "similar to those developed under the due process clause
of the United States Constitution"' 55 and cites to International
Shoe and related cases.' 5 6
The principles of international law described above are
rules that apply generally; a separate question is whether the
rules change when a foreign sovereign defendant is involved.
Prior to 1952, when the restrictive theory of immunity 57 was
accepted in the United States and elsewhere, authorities on
international law would not have addressed this question because states prior to that time enjoyed absolute immunity from
1 58
suit.

With the development of the restrictive theory of im-

munity, however, authorities on international law seem to concur that traditional limitations on personal jurisdiction apply
as much to sovereign defendants as to private defendants. For
example, consider the current version, promulgated by the International Law Commission (ILC), of the Draft Articles on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property. The
commentary to Article 10 (the article that provides an exception to immunity for commercial transactions) states that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity "presupposes the existence of
jurisdiction or the competence of a court in accordance with
the relevant internal law of the State of the forum .... [which]
may also include the applicable rules of private international
law." 59 In other words, even if the commercial activity excep(j) the person, whether natural or juridical, had carried on
outside the state an activity having a substantial, direct, and fore-

seeable effect within the state, but only in respect of such activity;
or

(k) the thing that is the subject of adjudication is owned, pos-

sessed, or used in the state, but only in respect of a claim reasonably connected with that thing.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 421(2).

155. Id. § 421 (Reporters' Note 1).

156. See id. (Reporters' Note 2).
157. For discussion of the restrictive theory, see supra Part II.A.
158. See The Schooner Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136
(1812) ("The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute.").
159. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, art. 10, cmt. 3, published in Report of
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR,
43d Session, Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991). For a discussion of
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tion to sovereign immunity applies, the forum state also is limited by the rules of personal jurisdiction. The two questions
are thus treated as distinct. Professor Higgins also submits
that the question of jurisdictional nexus is separate from that
of sovereign immunity:
[T]his is really a question of jurisdiction, not of immunity. It is for countries to formulate the circumstances in which they will be prepared to assert jurisdiction over events occurring abroad. I see no reason
of principle why jurisdiction over a foreign State
160
should not stand or fall on these principles ....
Professor Higgins suggests that, where an exception to
sovereign immunity applies, territorial limits on jurisdiction
party.1 61
should apply equally to a foreign state as to a private
To summarize, the rules limiting jurisdiction under international law are similar to the limits that the Supreme Court
has developed in the InternationalShoe line of cases. These limits apply to sovereign defendants (assuming, of course, that an
exception to immunity applies) just as they to do private debases of extraterritofendants. While there are other accepted 162
these relate more
rial jurisdiction under international law,
an earlier version of ILC Draft Article 10 and commentary, see Trooboff,
supra note 90, at 327-29. See alsoJames Crawford, InternationalLaw and Foreign
Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune Transactions, 1983 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 75,
108-09 (1983) (reviewing an earlier version of Draft Article 10 and concluding that "the Draft Article tends to confirm the view that no specialjurisdictional links are required for commercial transactions" (emphasis added)).
160. Rosalyn C. Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 265, 273 (1982), quoted in Trooboff, supra note
90, at 322.
161. Higgins, supra note 160, at 268-72. Note that the current version of
the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters takes a similar approach to the matter, by separating the questions of immunity and personal jurisdiction. See Draft Hague
Convention, supra note 19, art. 1(3) (providing that a dispute is not excluded from the scope of the Convention simply because a party is a government or governmental entity); cf id. art. 1(4) (providing that nothing in the
Convention affects the privileges and immunities of sovereigns). See also infra Part V.
162. The Restatement (Third) lists the protective principle (offenses, such
as counterfeiting, directed against the security of a state) and the passive
personality principle (offenses, such as terrorism, directed against the nationals of a state) as recognized bases for exercising jurisdiction to prescribe
law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 402 cmts. f, g. The Restate-
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to a state's jurisdiction to prescribe law to punish individual
crimes. The idea of universal jurisdiction and the extent to
which it relates to the anti-terrorism amendment is discussed
in Part IV.B below.
D.

Status of InternationalLaw in the U.S.
ConstitutionalFramework

The previous sections explain why, although a foreign sovereign defendant may not be entitled to challenge jurisdiction
on constitutional grounds, it can challenge jurisdiction on international law grounds. Since the FSIA is the sole basis on
which a suit against a foreign state may be brought in the
United States, 1 63 the issue becomes how international law on
extraterritorial jurisdiction may be used to interpret the jurisdictional nexus provisions of the FSIA. The following section
considers the status of international law in the U.S. constitutional system, and suggests an approach to interpreting and
applying the FSIA.
The Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties are the "supreme law" of the United States. 164 In addition to these, the
Supreme Court recognized a century ago in The Paquete Habana that the rules of international law are also part of U.S.
law:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice of
appropriate jurisdiction ....
[W]here there is no
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ....
Note the caveat about legislative acts. The Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law takes the position that cusment (Third) also recognizes that, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law to punish "certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern," such as
piracy, genocide and aircraft hijacking. Id. § 404. For an analysis proposing
broader utilization of the universal jurisdiction principle, see Kenneth C.
Randall, UniversalJurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785

(1988).
163. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
434, 439 (1989).
164. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
165. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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tomary international law is federal law and thus preempts inconsistent state law. 16 6 The Restatement also provides, however, that an act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law if that is the clear purpose of the act or if the
act cannot be fairly reconciled with international law. 167 In
other words, if a federal statute violates existing principles of
international law, the "last in time" rule applies and the federal statute will prevail over an earlier rule of international
law. 168

United States v. Yunis illustrates the application of this principle in the context of the extraterritorial application of a federal statute.169 This case involved the 1985 hijacking of a
Royal Jordanian Airlines flight in Beirut. Undercover FBI
agents lured Yunis, a participant in the hijacking, onto a yacht
in the Mediterranean Sea, arrested him, and flew him to the
United States where he was convicted of conspiracy, hostage
taking, and air piracy. 170 On appeal, Yunis argued that U.S.
courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him since he was
brought into the jurisdiction by force. He argued that the relevant statutes, the Hostage Taking Act and the Antihijacking
Act, should be construed not to apply to him in order to comply with international law. 1 71 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument. It noted that the Hostage Taking
Act reflected the unambiguous intent of Congress to authorize
prosecution of those who take U.S. nationals hostage, no matter where the offense occurs. 172 In response to Yunis's international law argument, the court responded that its duty is "to
enforce the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States, not to conform the law of the land to norms of custom166. RESTATEMENT (THIRD),supra note 39, § 111 (1986). But see Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815 (1997) (arguing
against the proposition that customary international law should attain the
status of federal common law).
167. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 115(1) (a).
168. However, even if arguably developed "last in time," it is unlikely that

a rule of customary international law would ever be held to supersede an act
of Congress. See id. § 115 (Reporters' Note 4); see also Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 166, at 843.

169. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
170. See id. at 1089-90.

171. See id. at 1090.
172. See id. at 1091.
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ary international law."'1 73 The court was unwilling to apply international law limits on jurisdiction to defeat the clear intent
of Congress as reflected in the statute.
The Supreme Court, however, has held, consistent with
the Restatement

(Third),174 that a statute should be con-

strued, wherever possible, in accordance with international
law. This canon of statutory interpretation dates back to Supreme Court ChiefJustice John Marshall who, in Murray v. The
Charming Betsy, stated that "an act of Congress ought never to
be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible
construction remains ....
*"175 More recently, Justice Scalia, in
Hartford FireInsurance Co. v. California,cited The CharmingBetsy
for the proposition that the Sherman Act should not apply extraterritorially where such application would conflict with principles of international law:
[The canon of construction in The CharmingBetsy] is
relevant to determining the substantive reach of a
statute because "the law of nations," or customary international law, includes limitations on a nation's exercise of its jurisdiction to prescribe. Though it
clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress
is generally presumed not to have exceeded those
customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to
prescribe.176

Citing the Restatement (Third), Justice Scalia argued
that, notwithstanding the fact that it was "well established" that
the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially, the Court should
refrain from applying the Sherman Act to the extraterritorial
acts of a group of London-based insurance companies because
such assertion of jurisdiction was unreasonable under interna173. Id.
174. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 115 cmt. a (1986) ("when
an act of Congress and an international agreement or a rule of customary
international law relate to the same subject, the courts ... will endeavor to
construe them so as to give effect to both.").
175. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804). The Court held that an embargo imposed by Congress to suspend

"all commercial intercourse" between the United States and France could
not be applied to an American citizen living and conducting business in St.

Thomas whose ship was documented with Danish papers. See id. at 120-21.
176. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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tional law. 1 77 Although Hartford Fire Insuranceinvolved the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, a question of subject
matter jurisdiction, Justice Scalia's approach is also applicable
to interpret the extraterritorial reach of personal jurisdiction
over foreign sovereign defendants under the FSIA.
United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization1 78 demonstrates the lengths to which a court may go ,to interpret a federal statute so as not to conflict with U.S. international obligations. The case involved the application of the Anti-terrorism
Act of 1987 to the activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the United States. 179 The United States, relying on the Anti-terrorism Act, sought an injunction to close
the PLO's permanent observer mission to the United Nations
in New York City. The court refused to issue the injunction on
the grounds that such a ruling would abrogate the United
States's obligation to establish an international enclave in New
York City for the United Nations's headquarters. 180 Although
the Anti-terrorism Act prohibits the establishment of any "office, headquarters, premises or other facilities" by the PLO
within the United States, 8 1 the court interpreted this language not to apply to the PLO's permanent observer mission
to the United Nations. Citing The CharmingBetsy as well as the
Restatement (Third),1 8 2 the court held that, in order to reconcile the Anti-terrorism Act with U.S. obligations under the
177. Id. at 814, 818. Justice Scalia also supported his argument by reference to Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ("We are not to read general
words, such as those in [the Sherman] Act, without regard to the limitations
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of Laws."'),
cited in Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 814.
178. 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
179. For discussion of Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (challenging the constitutionality of the Anti-terrorism Act of 1987),
see supra text accompanying note 108.
180. This obligation is contained in the Agreement Between the United
Nations and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of
the United Nations, June 26, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1676, 11 U.N.T.S. 11 (1947)
[hereinafter Headquarters Agreement], cited in United States v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 n.2 (1988).
181. Anti-terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C. § 5202, reprinted in PalestineLiberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1472 app. a.

182. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1465 (quoting
(THIRD),

RESTATEMENT

supra note 39, § 115).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 34:115

Headquarters Agreement, an exception must be read into the
Anti-terrorism Act to allow PLO representatives access to the
United Nations.18 3 Although United States v. PalestineLiberation
Organization involves an international agreement as opposed
to customary international law, both this opinion and Justice
Scalia's dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance rely on Supreme
Court precedent applying the maxim in The CharmingBetsy to
reconcile conflicts between statutes and customary interna18 4
tional law.
If we apply these principles to the FSIA and its amendments, we have a basis for interpreting the ambiguous language of the commercial activity and expropriation exceptions
in the FSIA in accordance with customary international law, a
basis that provides an alternative to the Texas Trading approach of applying the constitutional "minimum contacts"
test. The anti-terrorism amendment to the FSIA, however,
presents a potential conflict between Congressional intent and
customary international law principles relating to personal jurisdiction. Customary international law limitations on jurisdiction cannot trump the unambiguous intent of Congress. Although the anti-terrorism exception arguably transcends customary international law limitations on jurisdiction, a court in
applying the amendment is constrained to follow the intent of
Congress in enacting the amendment. In addition, the arbitration amendment, which provides an exception to immunity
to enforce international commercial arbitration awards, does
not require an independent jurisdictional nexus with the
United States because international law does not require one.
I elaborate upon these conclusions in the following section.
183. See id. Such a reading was possible since neither the PLO mission to
the United Nations nor the Headquarters Agreement was mentioned expressly in the text of the Anti-terrorism Act. See id. at 1468.
184. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hond., 372 U.S.
10, 21-22 (1963) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act does not

apply to crews on ships flying under foreign flag but owned by U.S. corporations; for jurisdiction to extend to this "delicate field of international rela-

tions," Congress must provide for it unambiguously); Lauritzen v. Larson,
345 U.S. 571, 573 n.1, 578 (1953) (holding, in accordance with international
maritime law, that a U.S. statute allowing "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer
personal injury in the course of his employment" to bring a tort claim does
not apply to a Danish seaman who was injured while sailing under the Danish flag).
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IV.

A.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE

FSIA.

Commercial Activity and ExpropriationExceptions

The FSIA as originally enacted provided an exception to
immunity in cases of waiver, commercial activity, expropriation, determining rights in property present in the United
States, and adjudicating certain torts occurring within U.S. territory. 18 5 Other than waiver (discussed in Part IV.C), the two
exceptions that have the greatest potential extraterritorial
reach are the commercial activity and the expropriation exceptions, each analyzed below.
As discussed in Part II, the commercial activity exception
to the FSIA contains a jurisdictional nexus requirement-that
is, the statute only allows an exception to sovereign immunity
if the suit is based on conduct in or directly affecting the
United States. 18 6 As the legislative history to the FSIA demonstrates, Congress included the condition of some connection
to the United States in order to comply with due process requirements.1 8 7 This would suggest that, to the extent that the
statutory requirement under the FSIA is met, the constitutional test is met as well. Indeed, in his recent opinion in Rein
v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiya,Judge Calabresi of the
Second Circuit noted that the language of the commercial activity exception to the FSIA and the constitutional requirement of "minimum contacts" amount to essentially the same
test.18 8 In discussing a related case, Judge Calabresi observed:
The finding of subject matter jurisdiction under the
commercial activities [sic] exception also entailed a
In other words,
finding of minimum contacts ....
the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction were inextricably intertwined, because
the court could not have answered the former without saying everything that was required to answer the
185. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1994 &

Supp. V 1999).
186. See supra Part II.A.
187. See id.
188. See Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 162 F.3d 748,
760-61 (2d Cir. 1998). This case involved Libya's alleged involvement in the
terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The families of the victims of Flight 103 brought suit against Libya under the antiterrorism amendment to the FSIA.
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latter. Indeed... the issues were more than inextri189
cably intertwined: they were essentially identical.
Thus according to Judge Calabresi, conducting a "minimum contacts" test to determine personal jurisdiction under
the commercial activity exception to the FSIA would be superfluous, since the language of the statute already incorporates
the same test.' 90
To the extent that the constitutional test is consistent with
international law, applying the statutory language as Judge
Calabresi describes also would be consistent with customary international law. Since the language of the commercial activity
exception is ambiguous, however, courts have interpreted the
jurisdictional language in different ways, some of which create
tension with international law norms.
One such ambiguity relates to the extent to which the
U.S.-based activity required under the statute must form the
basis for the cause of action. In other words, does the commercial activity exception allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant based on mere general, as opposed to specific,jurisdiction? 19 1 In some of the earlier cases applying the commercial activity exception, courts
asserted jurisdiction in cases where commercial activity conducted by the foreign state in the United States was related
only loosely to the cause of action.19 2 However, in Saudi Arabia
189. Id. at 760-61 (discussing Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara Indon. (Persero), 148 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1998)). Interestingly, Judge Calabresi left for
another day the difficult issue of whether Libya was entitled to due process.
Since the case was brought to the Second Circuit on interlocutory appeal,
the only issue that the court addressed was whether the anti-terrorism exception to sovereign immunity applied. The scope of the court's jurisdiction on
interlocutory appeal did not extend to the question of personal jurisdiction
(i.e., minimum contacts). See id. at 756.
190. See also S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292, 1304
(11 th Cir. 2000) ("The 'direct effects' language of section 1605 (a) (2) closely
resembles the 'minimum contacts' language of constitutional due process
and these two analyses have overlapped."); cf In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d
247, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that, as for the first prong of
§ 1605(a) (2), the commercial activity on which the action is based must have
"substantial contact" with the United States, which is "more than the minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy due process in establishing personal jurisdiction").
191. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1992) (applying the commercial activity exception in an expropria-
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v. Nelson, the Supreme Court interpreted the "based upon"
language in the statute as requiring a tight nexus between the
U.S.-based activity and the claim. 19 3 Specifically, the Court
held that the commercial activity exception did not apply to an
international tort claim brought by a U.S. employee against his
Saudi government-owned employer. 94 Although the employment contract was concluded in the United States-a "commercial activity"-Nelson's claim was based on the imprisonment and other mistreatment that he suffered in Saudi Arabia. 19 5 The Court concluded that the U.S.-based activity of the
Saudi government did not form the basis for Nelson's claim,
1 96
and that therefore there was no jurisdiction under the FSIA.
The Nelson decision, by denying jurisdiction over the alleged
torture of a U.S. citizen, shows the need for a statutory exception to sovereign immunity for certain human rights violations, 197 but the Supreme Court's holding in Nelson is correct
tion claim based on Argentina's solicitation of U.S. clients for the Argentine
hotel that was expropriated from plaintiff); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland,
682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (applying the commercial activity exception
in a claim for conversion and theft of intellectual property rights and proprietary information from a venture based in Ireland based on preliminary negotiations for the venture conducted in the United States); Rio Grande
Transp., Inc. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 516 F.
Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowing jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception in a maritime collision case on the basis of Algeria's unrelated commercial activity in the United States).
193. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356-63 (1993). This language
comes from the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (2), which requires that the action be "based upon" one of the three prongs of the test. See supra text
accompanying note 38 (quoting the language of § 1605 (a) (2)).
194. See Nelson, 507 U.S. at 349.
195. Id. at 351-53. Nelson alleged that Saudi government agents detained
him in a Saudi prison, where he was beaten and tortured, in retaliation for
his reporting of safety violations in the Saudi hospital where he was employed. Id. at 352-53.
196. See id. at 352-53. Strangely, however, the Court also held, without
elaboration, that it lacked jurisdiction over Nelson's separate claim based on
the Saudi government's negligent failure to warn him of the dangers associated with the employment. See id. at 363. Justice Kennedy dissented from
this aspect of the holding, reasoning (correctly, I believe) that this separate
claim was in fact "based upon" U.S.-based activity, i.e., the negotiation and
execution of Nelson's employment contract. See id. at 371-73 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
197. See also Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 713-19 (recognizing that the
prohibition against torture has attained the status of a jus cogens norm, but
holding that violation of a jus cogens norm does not in itself confer jurisdic-
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for purposes of interpreting the commercial activity exception.
The Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the statute,
only allowing jurisdiction where the U.S.-based contacts are
closely related to the cause of action, is an approach that is
consistent with international practice. 19 8
Another ambiguity that opens the door to extraterritorial
assertions of jurisdiction is the third prong of the commercial
activity exception-the prong of FSIA section 1605(a) (2) that
allows jurisdiction where an act outside of the United States
causes a "direct effect" in the United States. The Supreme
Court's interpretation of this prong of the commercial activity
exception in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,199 in contrast to
its holding in Nelson, arguably exceeds international norms.
Until the Supreme Court decided Weltover in 1992, courts
tended to interpret the "direct effect" language to mean that
the effect also had to be "substantial and foreseeable" in order
to support jurisdiction. 200 This interpretation was based in
part on the legislative history of the 1976 statute, which states
that the "direct effect" prong of the commercial activity exception should be applied in a manner "consistent with the principles set forth in" the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, and, in particular, the section describing limits on a
state's jurisdiction to prescribe law. 20 1 This section allows pretion under the FSIA, citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping

Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
198. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 421 (2) (allowing jurisdiction to adjudicate either where the defendant "regularly carries on business"
or where the defendant "had carried on activity in the state, but only in respect
of such activity" (emphasis added)).
199. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992); see also supra
text accompanying note 16.
200. See, e.g., Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 877
F.2d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]o supportjurisdiction under the FSIA the
domestic effects of a foreign state's actions must be 'substantial' and 'direct
and foreseeable."'); Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793,
799 (9th Cir. 1989); Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511, 1514
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445,
453 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that economic injury to a U.S. company could
satisfy the "direct effect" prong of the test, but only if the company were the
direct victim of the conduct and "if injurious and significant financial consequences to that corporation were the foreseeable, rather than the fortuitous,
result of the conduct").
201. See FLOWERS, JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN SUITS
AGAINST FOREIGN STATES, H.R. No. 94-1487, at 19 (1976).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

2001]

scriptive jurisdiction based on "effects" within the territory of20 a2

state if such effects are substantial, direct, and foreseeable.
In Weltover, the Supreme Court dispensed with the idea
that the "direct effect" requirement of the commercial activity
exception must be substantial or foreseeable. With no explanation (other than describing the Restatement section cited in
the legislative history as "a bit of a non sequitui' since it deals
with prescriptive rather than adjudicative jurisdiction), the
Court simply rejected the requirement that effects must be
20 3
While agreeing that "purely trivsubstantial or foreseeable.
ial effects" in the United States would not be sufficient to confer jurisdiction, the Court held that an effect is sufficiently "direct" if it follows "as an immediate consequence of the defendant's .. activity."2 0 4 It is particularly notable that the Court
reached this conclusion because it was not necessary to the
outcome of the case. Since the debt obligation at issue was to
be performed in New York, Argentina's failure to repay that
in the United
obligation in a timely fashion produced an effect 20
5
States that was both substantial and foreseeable.
This aspect of the holding in Weltover effectively broadens
the jurisdictional nexus in the commercial activity exception
beyond internationally-recognized limits to encompass any
commercial act of a foreign state that produces a direct effect
in the United States. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
202. See

RESTATEMENT

UNITED STATES §

(SECOND)

OF

FOREIGN

RELATIONS

LAW

OF

THE

18(b) (1965).

203. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 617-18.
204. Id.at 618, (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 941 F.2d 145,
152 (2d Cir. 1991)).

205. The U.S. government, in the amicus brief filed by Solicitor General

Kenneth Starr, argued that Argentina's breach of the bond obligation was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction:

The breach is a 'substantial' effect in the legally relevant sense because the place of payment is central to performance of a contractual debt obligation, and the failure to pay there denies the creditor the benefits to which he is contractually entitled. Furthermore,

a breach in the United States was foreseeable in light of the fact

that New York is the designated place of performance.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 14,
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (No. 91-763). Find-

ingjurisdiction on these facts also would be consistent with the Draft Hague

Convention, which allows for specific jurisdiction over breach of contract
actions in the place where the obligation is to be performed. See Draft
Hague Convention, supra note 19, art. 6.
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dismissal in Weltover of the legislative history to the 1976 statute, customary international law does limit jurisdiction to adjudicate just as it limits jurisdiction to prescribe. Since the notion of asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of "effects"

within

a

territory

is

itself

controversial, 20

6

the

Restatement (Third) recognizes "effects"-based jurisdiction to
adjudicate only in limited circumstances-specifically, where
the defendant has carried on extraterritorial activity "having a
substantial,direct, and foreseeable effect within the state." 207
Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Government of Honduras
illustrates the potential breadth of the "direct effects" language as interpreted by Weltover.20 8 The case arose out of a
technical assistance contract between a Honduran company
and the Honduras government to upgrade Honduras's civil
aeronautics program. The contract contemplated establishing
a computing center in Honduras that would be in communication with a database managed by the plaintiff in Miami, Flor20 9

ida.

After a change of leadership in the Honduras govern-

ment, the government cancelled the contract. Plaintiff
brought suit in U.S. court to recover payment for services rendered, and Honduras raised the defense of sovereign immunity. The existence of the Miami database, plus the potential
involvement of U.S. inspectors in the upgrade process, was
held by the court to be a sufficient jurisdictional nexus to satisfy the "direct effect" prong of the commercial activity exception.210 Yet any U.S.-based effects resulting from the breach in

this case are indirect; they certainly would not amount to the
"substantial, direct, and foreseeable effects" required
by the
Restatement (Third) standard in order to confer jurisdiction.
Fortunately, cases such as HondurasAircraft Registry are relatively unusual. While Weltover is often cited by U.S. courts for
206. See, e.g., IOPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW at 474-75 (9th ed. 1992)
(describing the commercial activity exception to the FSIA and commenting
that "[t] he justification for such assertions of jurisdiction on the basis of an
alleged 'effects' principle of jurisdiction has not been generally accepted,
and the matter is still one of controversy").
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 421(2) () (emphasis added).
208. Hond. Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Gov't of Hond., 129 F.3d 543 (11th

Cir. 1997).

209. See Hond. Aircraft Registry, 129 F.3d at 545.
210. See id. at 549. The opinion is silent as to whether Honduras had es-

tablished "minimum contacts" with the United States.
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the proposition that all that is necessary to confer jurisdiction
is a "direct effect," the situations where jurisdiction is found
tend to be those where a state-owned bank or company de2 1'
faults on a debt obligation payable in the United States.
Courts have tended not to find jurisdiction, for example, where
the commercial activity of a foreign state results in personal
injury or death of a U.S. citizen abroad. They are unwilling to
hold that the death or injury of a U.S. person abroad is a "direct effect" of the commercial activity, or that the cause of action is "based upon" any commercial activity that the foreign
2 1 2 This distincstate may have conducted in the United States.
tion is consistent with international practice, which supports
asserting jurisdiction in breach of contract actions in the foactions in the
rum where the performance is due and in 21tort
3
forum where the tort or the injury occurs.
The expropriation exception2 1 4 is an additional ambiguity
that may result in extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction. It
is a more narrow exception to immunity than the commercial
activity exception and therefore is litigated less frequently. It
only applies where "rights in property" have been taken in violation of international law and where one of two jurisdictional
nexus requirements apply: (i) the expropriated property (or
its proceeds) is present in the United States in connection with
the commercial activity of the foreign state or (ii) such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of
the foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United
States. 2 15 One obstacle to recovery under the expropriation
211. See Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887

(5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1041 (1998) (involving a breach of a
U.S. dollar-denominated letter of credit); Hanil Bank v. PT. Bank Negara

Indon., 148 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1998); Parex Bank v. Russian Sav. Bank, 116 F.
Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving a breach of rubles-for-dollars forward exchange contract payable in the United States).
212. See, e.g., Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841 (5th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom, Kelly v. Al Furat Petroleum Co., 531 U.S. 979
(2000); Per6 v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999).
213. See Draft Hague Convention, supra note 19, art. 10(1) (allowing specific jurisdiction for torts in either the state where the act occurred or the
state where the injury occurred), art. 6 (allowing specific jurisdiction for
contracts in the state where performance is due).
214. For the full text of the expropriation exception, see supra note 5.
215. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (3).
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exception is that, in order to implicate international law, the
expropriation must be from a person who is not a national of
the defendant state at the time of the taking. 216 Furthermore,
the taking must be illegal under international law. Courts
have held, for example, that in order to constitute an illegal
taking, the plaintiff must show that recourse to legal remedies
in the state's jurisdiction has been exhausted or would be fu21 7
tile.

Other courts have held that the expropriation excep-

tion only applies to takings of "tangible" property. 2 18 Finally,
even ifjurisdiction is found, any action involving an expropriation is subject to dismissal on act of state grounds. 2 19
As for the jurisdictional nexus requirements, the first one
is met rarely, if ever, since it would be prohibitively difficult in
most cases to trace the proceeds from any sale of expropriated
property and it would be unusual for the expropriated property itself to make its way into the United States. 220 The second jurisdictional nexus requirement, allowing jurisdiction
where the expropriated property is owned or operated by an
216. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
711 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[E]xpropriation by a sovereign state of the property of
its own nationals does not implicate settled principles of international law.")
(quoting Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir.
1990)).
217. See Millicom Int'l Cellular v. Republic of Costa Rica, 995 F. Supp. 14,
23 (D.D.C. 1998) ("[A] claimant cannot complain that a 'taking' or other
economic injury . .. violates international law unless the claimant has first
pursued and exhausted domestic remedies in the foreign state.").
218. See Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compania de Acero, 528 F. Supp.
1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984).
219. The Act of State doctrine is a judicially-created rule that "the courts
of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897). The doctrine, while related to international law, derives its
force from concerns relating to the separation of powers. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963). See generally Lee C.
Buchheit, Act of State and Comity: Recent Developments, in JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS (D. Sassoon & B. Bradlow eds.,
1987). Since expropriations typically are conducted within the territory of a
foreign sovereign, lawsuits challenging the legality of expropriations in U.S.
courts often are dismissed on Act of State grounds. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
220. One hypothetical possibility (apparently not a basis forjurisdiction in
the actual case) would be if Adele I or the other paintings claimed by the
plaintiff in the Altmann case were exhibited in the United States at the time
of suit.
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agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in a commercial activity in the United States, is invoked more fre2 21
quently in cases involving the expropriation exception.
Thus, similar to the commercial activity exception, jurisdiction
ultimately turns on whether an agency or instrumentality of
the foreign state is "engaged in commercial activity" in the
United States.
The rule in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson requiring a close connection between the U.S.-based commercial activity and the
cause of action has not been held to apply to the expropriation exception. Indeed, since the statutory language of the expropriation exception does not require expressly that the action be "based upon" the commercial activity of the agency or
instrumentality, 222 courts have held that the jurisdictional
nexus requirement in the expropriation exception only reor instrumentality be "doing business"
quires that the agency
223
in the United States.
Such a broad interpretation of the jurisdictional nexus requirement was adopted by the court in Altmann v. Republic of
Austria to assert jurisdiction over Austria for the 1938 expropriation of six Gustav Klimt paintings from the plaintiff's fam221. One such case finding jurisdiction under the expropriation exception is Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. ProvisionalMilitay Gov't of SocialistEth.,
616 F. Supp. 660 (D.C. Mich. 1985). The case involved the Ethiopian government's expropriation from a U.S. shareholder of a majority of the stock
of a spice extraction joint venture. The Act of State doctrine was not a bar to
the suit, due to a bilateral treaty between Ethiopia and the United States. See
id. at 661. Since, subsequent to the expropriation, the spice extraction company exported $1.2 million worth of oleoresins to the United States and imported supplies from the United States, the court held that the company was
an instrumentality of the Ethiopian government engaged in commercial activity in the United States. See id. at 664.
222. The exception only requires that the expropriated property (or any
property exchanged for such property) be "owned or operated" by the
agency or instrumentality that is engaged in commercial activity in the
United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (3).
223. See Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (observing, in a case arising before Nelson, that the expropriation exception,
unlike the commercial activity exception, "clearly embodies a 'doing business' test"); cf Zappia Middle E. Constr. Co. v. Emirate ofAbu Dhabi, 1996
WL 413680, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1996) ("The second prong of the expropriation exception permits lesser contacts with the United States than ordinarily would be required to comply with due process.").
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Jurisdiction under the expropriation exception was premised on the Austrian Gallery's publication (presumably in
Austria) of a museum guidebook in English and the advertisement in the United States of the gallery's collection. 2 25 Similarly, in Siderman de Blake, the Ninth Circuit asserted jurisdiction over Argentina for the expropriation of the plaintiff's
company, on the basis of Argentina's "solicitation and entertainment of American guests" and the "acceptance of American credit cards and traveler's checks" in Argentina at the hoily.224

tel that was taken from plaintiff.2 26

Again, such an expansive reading of the FSIA puts it in
conflict with international norms relating to personal jurisdiction. The language of the expropriation exception, while not
containing the express nexus language of the commercial activity exception, is nonetheless susceptible to a construction
that is more consistent with international law. Looking again
to the Restatement (Third), international law restricts a state's
exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate to specific jurisdiction
(i.e., on the basis of contacts that are closely connected to the
cause of action) 22 7 or to where the defendant "regularly carries on business in the state." 228 It would not be a stretch to
interpret the "engaging in a commercial activity" language in
the expropriation exception so as to require at least regularac224. See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal.
2001); see also supra Part I.
225. See Altmann, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1204-06.
226. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 712 (9th
Cir. 1992).

227. See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD),

supra note 39, § 421(2) (i).

228. Id. § 421(2)(h). While an established part of the U.S. law on person'al jurisdiction, the idea of premising jurisdiction on "doing business"
alone is somewhat controversial internationally. See, e.g., Vencedora Oceanica,
730 F.2d at 209 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) ("'[D]oing business' is a
more controversial jurisdictional ground to assert over foreign entities than
is a nexus ground."). Indeed, differences between the U.S. and European
approaches on this issue were one of the sticking points between the United
States and European countries during the negotiation of the convention. See
Memorandum from the United States Department of State, Draft Hague

Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments 2 (Aug. 5, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Memorandum] ("[Ci]vil law attorneys (and their clients) are profoundly uncomfortable with jurisdiction based on doing business or minimum contacts,
which they find vague and unpredictable.").
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tivity within the United States. Such a construction would suggest a different result in Altmann as well as in Siderman de Blake.
To summarize, while Congress in drafting the FSIA expressly incorporated a jurisdictional nexus for each of the
commercial activity and expropriation exceptions, the statutory language is ambiguous and has been subjected to differing interpretations. This article proposes that these exceptions be interpreted narrowly so as to harmonize the FSIA with
international norms of personal jurisdiction.
B.

Anti-Terrorism Amendment

As discussed above in Part II.B, the anti-terrorism amendment allows an exception to immunity for torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the "provision
of material support or resources" for such act. In contrast with
the exceptions to immunity listed in the 1976 statute, the antiterrorism amendment has no jurisdictional nexus requirement
other than a requirement that either the claimant or the victim be a U.S. national at the time that the criminal act was
perpetrated. 229 Because of the very broad extraterritorial
scope of the amendment, courts applying it are presented
squarely with the question of whether jurisdiction may be asserted against a foreign state under the FSIA if the state lacks
"minimum contacts" with the United States.
Of the handful of cases that have addressed this question
to date, 230 the decision that contains the most detailed analysis
of whether a foreign state is a "person" for due process purposes is Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran.23 1 Alisa Flatow was a
229. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii). The very broad extraterritorial
scope of the anti-terrorism amendment can be contrasted with that of the
tort exception under the 1976 statute, which is limited to certain torts "occurring in the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (5).

230. See, e.g., Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107
(D.D.C. 2000); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C.
2000); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2000); Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2000);
Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 110 F. Supp. 2d 10
(D.D.C. 2000); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62

(D.D.C. 1998); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1998); Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325

(E.D.N.Y. 1998), affd in part, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
231. 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
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twenty year-old college student who was killed when an Israeli
bus was destroyed by a suicide bomber. 23 2 Relying on the antiterrorism amendment, the Flatow family brought a wrongful
death action against the Iranian government for its financial
support of the terrorist cell that claimed responsibility for the
bombing. Judge Lamberth of the District Court for the District of Columbia issued a default judgment in favor of the
Flatows and ordered that Iran pay $22.5 million of compensatory damages plus $225 million in punitive damages. 23 3
In upholding jurisdiction, the Flatow court found that the
anti-terrorism amendment to the FSIA clearly was intended to
apply to extraterritorial conduct such as Iran's involvement in

the bombing. 234 After a discussion of Katzenbach and Justice
Scalia's dicta in Weltover, Judge Lamberth also concluded that

a foreign state is not a "person" for purposes of the Due Process Clause. 235 The court nonetheless applied the "minimum
contacts" test to find that Alisa Flatow's nationality as a U.S.
citizen along with Iran's general "sovereign contacts" with the
United States, were sufficient contacts to satisfy the constitu236
tional test.
232. See id. at 7.
233. See id. at 5.
234. See id. at 15. Interestingly, the decision cites EEOCv. Aramco, 499 U.S.
244 (1991) (holding that a statute will not be given extraterritorial effect
unless Congress so indicates).
235. See id. at 19-21.
236. Id. at 21-23. The court concluded that "a foreign state that sponsors
terrorist activities, which cause the death or personal injury of a United
States national, invariably will have sufficient contacts with the United States
to satisfy Due Process." Id. at 23. Other decisions applying the anti-terrorism amendment have used similar reasoning to find "minimum contacts"
from a foreign state's support of terrorist activity affecting U.S. nationals. See
Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325, 330
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that Libya's role in the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 satisfied the constitutional test since "[a]ny foreign state would know
that the United States has substantial interests in protecting its flag carriers
and its nationals from terrorist activities..."); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000) (concluding, as in Flatow, that a
foreign state that causes the death of a U.S. national through an act of statesponsored terrorism has the requisite "minimum contacts" with the United
States so as not to offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice"). For a critique of this approach, see Caplan, supra note 48, at 41115 (characterizing the decisions in Flatow and Rein as a "distortion" of personal jurisdiction law).
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Assuming that Judge Lamberth is correct and a foreign
state is not a "person," the analysis set forth in Part III.D above
suggests that the anti-terrorism amendment, an act of Congress, "trumps" international law norms of personal jurisdiction. Thus, regardless of the anti-terrorism amendment's legality under international law, a court is constrained to apply
it. It is still worthwhile to consider the international law of
jurisdiction as it relates to the anti-terrorism amendment, however, as a guide to the interpretation and application of that
amendment.
Some have suggested that the anti-terrorism amendment
is supported by international law under the passive personality
principle 23 7 or under universal jurisdiction. 23 8 While there is
still substantial disagreement over the scope of universal jurisdiction,2 3 9 a credible argument can be made that at least some
of the crimes listed in the anti-terrorism amendment (in particular, torture, aircraft sabotage, and hostage taking) fall
within the doctrine of universal jurisdiction. 240 Even if Con237. See Price v.Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiriya, 110 F. Supp. 2d
at 12-13 (suggesting that "[t]he passive personality" principle forms the underpinnings of Congress' grant of subject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA," and rejecting Libya's argument that the principle is disfavored under
international law); see also Glannon and Atik, supra note 48, at 699. For an
explanation of the principle, see supra note 162.
238. See 1994 Hearings, supra note 52, at 23 (testimony of Sen. Arlen Specter) (supporting the anti-terrorism amendment), quoted at supra note 55 and
accompanying text; see also Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 14 (noting that "international terrorism is subject to universal jurisdiction"). For a discussion of universal jurisdiction, see supra note 162.
239. Just to give one example, consider the sharply contrasting concurring
opinions in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(affirming the dismissal of claims brought against the Palestine Liberation
Organization for torture, hostage taking, and other tortious acts committed
in Israel). Judge Edwards argues that "commentators have begun to identify
a handful of heinous actions-each of which violates definable, universal
and obligatory norms ...." Id. at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring). On the
other hand, Judge Bork considers that "[a] djudication of [plaintiff's] claims
would require the analysis of international legal principles that are anything
but clearly defined and that are the subject of controversy touching 'sharply
on national nerves."' Id. at 804 (Bork, J., concurring). See also Randall, supra
note 162.
240. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra nofe 39, § 404 (listing "attacks on
and hijacking of aircraft" and "perhaps certain acts of terrorism" as falling
under universal jurisdiction); Id. Reporters' Note 1 (listing international
agreements providing for general jurisdiction for certain offenses, including
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gress has jurisdiction to prescribe the offenses listed in the
amendment, however, there is a difference between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate. U.S. cases basing extraterritorial jurisdiction on the passive personality principle involve jurisdiction to prescribe law to punish crimes or
41
other wrongs committed by individuals or corporations.
Similarly, recent cases suggesting an expansion of universal jurisdiction 242 tend to involve criminal actions against individual
the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, and stating that the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment "in effect provides for universal jurisdiction"). See also Randall, supra note 162, at 816-27 (considering whether
these conventions create rights or obligations vis-;t-vis nonsignatory states).
241. See, e.g., United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir.
1991) (finding jurisdiction to apply the penal statute for kidnapping and
murder of a DEA agent); United States v. Romero-Galue, 757 F.2d 1147
(11th Cir. 1985) (finding jurisdiction to apply the Marijuana on the High
Seas Act to foreign residents whose vessel was seized on the high seas);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D.
Penn. 1980) (finding jurisdiction to apply an antitrust statute to an alleged
conspiracy among Japanese companies).
242. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding
jurisdiction to hear genocide, torture, and other claims under the Alien Tort
Act against Bosnian war criminal Radovan Karadzic); Hilao v. Estate of
Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming an almost $2 billion judgment in a class action suit under the Alien Tort Act for acts of torture and

summary execution committed under the command of former Phillipines
ruler Ferdinand Marcos); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.
1985) (upholding the extradition to Israel of "Ivan the Terrible," a former
SS guard at the Treblinka concentration camp, under the principle of universal jurisdiction); Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding jurisdiction to hear a wrongful death claim under the Alien Tort Act
against a Paraguayan police official who allegedly tortured plaintiffs' son).
On the international level, jurisdiction increasingly has been asserted
over individuals for the commission of international crimes. See, e.g., Regina
v. Bow St. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, 3 W.L.R. 1456
(H.L. 1998), available at 1998 WL 1043992 (1998) (holding that former
Chilean dictator Gen. Augusto Pinochet could not assert immunity for torture and hostage taking); Marlise Simons, An Awful Task: Assessing 4 Roles in
Death of Thousands, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2001, at A3 (describing proceedings
conducted in Belgium against four Rwandans for their complicity in the
1994 massacre of a half million people in Rwanda).
Belgium recently revised its law to permit jurisdiction of its courts over
suits involving genocide and other crimes against humanity, regardless of
whether the suit bears any connection with Belgium. In response to this law,
suits have been filed in Belgian courts not only against the Rwandan defend-
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defendants who were either extradited or served with process
while residing in or visiting the adjudicating jurisdiction. 243
The passive personality principle and universal jurisdiction relate to a state's authority to define and punish crimes committed by individual persons, and thus may not be applicable to
the issue of state responsibility.
However, there are two principles that might support at
least some assertions of extra-territorial jurisdiction over foreign states under the anti-terrorism amendment: the "effects
principle" of jurisdiction to adjudicate and the notion of an
implied waiver of personal jurisdiction due to violation of ajus
cogens norm. As for the first of these principles, the effects
principle, the Restatement (Third) allows for the assertion of
jurisdiction to adjudicate where the defendant carried on an
activity outside of the state having a "substantial, direct, and
foreseeable" effect within the state. 24 4 An argument might be
made that jurisdiction over state sponsors of terrorism is justified under the effects principle. This argument is analogous
to Flatow and Rein, in which the courts found "minimum contacts" on the rationale that the defendant state was committing
terrorist acts against U.S. nationals.2 4 5 However, the Restatement (Third) only allows the assertion of jurisdiction on the
basis of "substantial, direct, and foreseeable" effects 246 where
such assertion ofjurisdiction is "reasonable."' 247 Application of
the "effects" principle might be reasonable in a case like Rein,
ants, but also against Yasir Arafat, Ariel Sharon, and Fidel Castro, among
others. Marlise Simons, Human Rights Cases Begin to Flood into Belgian Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at A8.
243. For example, the defendant in Filartigawas arrested and later served
with a complaint after he relocated to the United States. See Filartiga,630
F.2d at 878-79. Similarly, Ferdinand Marcos was served with complaints
shortly after he fled the Phillipines for Hawaii. See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 771.
Radovan Karadzic was served personally with a complaint while he was in
New York City. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 237. General Pinochet and Ivan
Demjanjuk were subject to extradition proceedings, and the Rwandan defendants had been residing in Belgium at the time they were charged. See
Simons, supra note 242.
244. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 421(2) (j); see also supra
Part III.C.
245. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998);
Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y.
1998), affd in part, 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir. 1998).
246. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 421 (2) (j).
247. Id. § 421(1).
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where Libya allegedly was closely involved in the bombing of
an aircraft flying under the U.S. flag and headed for the
United States. Application of the "effects" principle is more
suspect in a case such as Flatow, where the connection between
the alleged act and the effect (Iran's financial support of the
terrorist cell that perpetrated a suicide bombing of an Israeli
248
bus containing U.S. and other tourists) is less direct.

A second argument that might justify assertion ofjurisdiction under the anti-terrorism amendment could be made in
cases where the foreign state violated a jus cogens norm. A jus
cogens norm of international law is one that is "accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as 249a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted."
The general idea is that certain practices-for example genocide or slavery-are so universally condemned that any civilized nation would regard the practice as criminal. At least
one prominent U.S. judge has argued that a foreign state that
violates a jus cogens norm waives its immunity from suit. In a
case involving a claim of an Auschwitz survivor against the Federal Republic of Germany, Judge Wald of the Circuit Court of
the District of Columbia argued in a dissenting opinion that
Germany implicitly waived its immunity defense to plaintiffs
reparations claims:
Jus cogens norms are by definition nonderogable, and
thus when a state thumbs its nose at such a norm, in
effect overriding the collective will of the entire international community, the state cannot be performing
a sovereign act entitled to immunity. When the Nazis
tore off Princz's clothes, exchanged them for a
prison uniform and a tattoo, shoved him behind the
barbed wire fences of Auschwitz and Dachau, and
248. As a general matter, that both U.S. and foreign courts tend to find
jurisdiction over tort actions in the state where the injury occurred rather
than on the basis of the victim's nationality also cuts against the "effects"
principle. See supra notes 212, 213 and accompanying text.
249. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, art. 53. The Vienna Convention on Treaties also uses the term
"peremptory norm." Id. Note that, in contrast with universal jurisdiction,
which addresses violations of individual responsibility, jus cogens addresses
state responsibility. See Randall, supra note 162, at 830, n.252 (citing
sources). Randall also notes that jus cogens means "compelling law." Id. at
830.
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sold him to the German armament industry as fodder
for their wartime labor operation, Germany rescinded any claim under international law to immu250
nity from this court's jurisdiction.
A similar argument was made by the Ninth Circuit in
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, where the court recognized that any state that engages in official torture violates jus
cogens. 25 1 Although Judge Wald referred to waiver of immunity
and not waiver of personal jurisdiction, an analogous argument can be made with respect to personal jurisdiction; that is,
a sovereign that commits crimes such as torture effectively
waives any objection to personal jurisdiction in a suit to punish
such crime. 252 Thus the implied waiver theory provides a lim250. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1182 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing Adam C. Belsky et al., Implied Waiver
Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory
Norms of InternationalLaw, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365, 396 (1989)). The majority in
Princz, however, rejected Judge Wald's position, refusing to find that the violation of a jus cogens norm amounts to an implied waiver of immunity under
the waiver exception to the FSIA. Pincz, 26 F.3d at 1173-74. The federal
courts that have recently considered this question have followed the majority
in Princz, rejecting Judge Wald's argument that the violation of a jus cogens
norm amounts to a waiver of sovereign immunity. See Sampson v. Federal
Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1151-55 (7th Cir. 2001) (considering
and rejecting Judge Wald's position); Hwang Guem Joo v. Japan, 172 F.
Supp. 2d 52, 60-61 (D.D.C. 2001) (same); Abrams v. Societe Nationale des
Chemins de Fer Francais, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (same).
251. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-17
(9th Cir. 1992). In an eloquent passage, the court stated:
The crack of the whip, the clamp of the thumb screw, the crush of
the iron maiden, and, in these more efficient modern times, the
shock of the electric cattle prod are forms of torture that the international order will not tolerate ....
That states engage in official
torture cannot be doubted, but all states believe it is wrong, all that
engage in torture deny it, and no state claims a sovereign right to
torture its own citizens.
Id. at 717. The court in Siderman, however, ultimately held, citing Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989), that the FSIA is
the sole basis under U.S. law for finding an exception to sovereign immunity. See id. at 718-19.
252. The commission of such crimes effectively represents a waiver of the
right to object to a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction. See infra notes
264-65 and accompanying text. Indeed, this idea is implicit in Judge Wald's
analysis, since the Princz facts also implicated the issue of extraterritorial assertion of personal jurisdiction over Germany. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1176-85
(Wald, J., dissenting).
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ited argument that an exercise of personal jurisdiction under
the anti-terrorism amendment is consistent with international
law, an argument valid only to the extent that the violation at
issue is a violation of a jus cogens norm.2

53

This position, how-

ever, has yet to be accepted by the courts.
To summarize, certain applications of the anti-terrorism
amendment may be consistent with international practice.
Two examples discussed above are assertions of jurisdiction
under the "effects" principle or under the implied waiver theory for violations of jus cogens norms. In other respects, the
anti-terrorism amendment represents a dramatic departure
from past international practice. First, the amendment addresses state (rather than individual) responsibility for international crimes. Second, while the amendment is overly narrow
in that it only applies to a short list of "rogue" states, 254 the
language of the amendment is at the same time very broad in
that it applies whenever a foreign state provides "material support or resources" for a terrorist act. 255 This vague language
neither rises to the level of a jus cogens violation nor falls within
the principle of universal jurisdiction. 256 A court applying the
253. While a detailed discussion of the offenses that amount to ajus cogens
violation is beyond the scope of this article, there is support for the idea that
at least the crime of torture, one of the crimes listed in the anti-terrorism
amendment, is prohibited byjus cogens. See Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 717
(concluding that official torture has attained the status of ajus cogens norm);
see also Sampson, 250 F.3d at 1155 (while declining to find an implicit waiver
under the FSIA, court conceded that Nazi Germany's acts of genocide and
enslavement are a "paradigm case" of a jus cogens violation).
254. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. In light of the events following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the fact that this list includes such
states as Syria and Iran-states that may prove useful to the United States in
its fight against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban regime-but omits Afghanistan illustrates the potential problems this legislation may create for
U.S. foreign policy.
255. Specifically, section 1605(a)(7) allows an exception to immunity
where a foreign state provides "material support or resources" for an act of
torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605 (a) (7). "Material support or resources" is defined broadly to mean
"currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials." 18
U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
256. There is a difference between "command responsibility"-that is,
holding a ruler such as Marcos or Karadzic responsible for the acts of his
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FSIA may try to interpret the statute wherever possible in a
manner consistent with international law, but, notwithstanding these problems, otherwise is constrained to apply the statute as written.
C.

Arbitration Amendment

Congress enacted the arbitration amendment to the FSIA
in 1988 to add a sixth exception to sovereign immunity, applicable where an action is brought to enforce or confirm certain
arbitration awards to which a foreign state is a party. 257 The
subordinates-and asserting jurisdiction over a state that provides financial
or other support for terrorist acts. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and
the United States's response to them, while driving home the need to combat terrorism, also illustrate how the anti-terrorism amendment focuses on
the wrong target. The focus of the Bush Administration's response has been
to hunt down and bring to justice Osama bin Laden, rather than to bring a
lawsuit against the state of Afghanistan. Along these same lines, Professor
Slaughter raises a number of policy reasons why the international community should prosecute individual terrorists, or terrorist leaders, for such
crimes, rather than the states that allegedly support them. She argues that
suing "unpopular" states complicates diplomacy, threatens U.S. assets
abroad, and runs the risk of politicizing the U.S. court system. See AnneMarie Slaughter & David Bosco, Editorial, Sue Terrorists, Not Terrorist States,
WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2000, at A25.
Indeed, because of its unprecedented nature, in practice the anti-terrorism amendment has proven to be difficult to enforce. After winning multimillion dollar judgments against foreign sovereign defendants, plaintiffs in
cases such as Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998),
and Aljandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997), were
frustrated in their efforts to attach foreign state assets to enforce their judgments, either because the assets were held to be diplomatic assets and therefore not subject to attachment, or because the U.S. government acted to
block the attachment. For details of the unsuccessful efforts by plaintiffs to
attach foreign state assets to enforce the Flatow and Alejandrejudgments, see
Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 94 AM.J. INT'L L. 102, 117-23 (2000).
To address these problems, Congress recently enacted legislation to ensure payment of compensatory damages to plaintiffs such as Alisa Flatow's
estate. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub.
L. 106-386, § 2003, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified at 42 USCA § 10601)
(establishing a reserve fund for the compensation of U.S. victims of international terrorism). Thus, the end result of the anti-terrorism amendment
may be that the damages awarded against states such as Cuba and Iran simply are being paid out of U.S. funds, with the State Department assuming the
task of negotiating for reimbursement from the defendant states.
257. See supra Part II.B.
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purpose of the arbitration amendment was to encourage reliance on international commercial arbitration by facilitating
the enforcement process and, in particular, to implement international agreements to which the United States is a party
relating to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards. 258 One such agreement is the New York Convention,
which obligates U.S. courts to recognize and enforce arbitration awards issued in any other contracting state. 259 Whenever
a foreign state agrees to arbitrate an international commercial
dispute in a state that is signatory to the New York Convention
(or a similar treaty relating to the recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards to which the United States is a
party), that arbitral award falls within the arbitration exception. Thus it is possible that a foreign sovereign defendant
who owns property in the United States but otherwise lacks
"minimum contacts" with the United States could be brought
into U.S. court in an action to enforce an arbitral award
against it. The question this section addresses is, assuming
that foreign states are not entitled to challenge jurisdiction on
constitutional grounds, whether such an action would violate
international customary law on jurisdiction. Since the arbitration exception involves actions to enforce arbitral awards rendered elsewhere rather than an action to litigate the underlying dispute, the plaintiff in such a suit should be able to enforce the award wherever the foreign state's assets may be

258. In discussing an earlier version of the bill that became the arbitration
amendment, Senator Mathias explained the policy behind the amendment:
"This amendment will reassure Americans engaged in international business
that the arbitration mechanism works. By preventing a foreign government
from invoking the sovereign immunity defense to escape enforcement of an
arbitral award, it will help secure the safety of U.S. companies' interests
abroad." 132 CONG. REC. 833742 (1986) (statement of Sen. Mathias). Although the amendment itself was part of implementing legislation for the
Inter-American Convention, the United States is a signatory to two additional agreements for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards:
the New York Convention, supra note 43, and the ICSID Convention, supra
note 46.
259. See supra Part II.B. The New York Convention was implemented
through a 1970 amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act and is codified at
9 U.S.C. § 201 (1999).
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found 26 0 regardless of whether the state possesses "minimum
contacts" with the place of enforcement.
It is worth noting that sovereign immunity and personal
jurisdiction can be waived. 26 1 Even prior to 1952 when absolute immunity was the rule, it had been long accepted that
262
waiver was a permissible exception to sovereign immunity.
Before Congress amended the FSIA to add the arbitration exception, a number of courts had interpreted agreements to arbitrate as implied waivers of immunity. The arbitration
amendment eliminated any ambiguity on this issue. 263 It also
260. Of course, not all assets of a foreign sovereign are subject to attachment and execution. The FSIA provides special exceptions to immunity
against attachment and execution of assets owned by a foreign state. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1609-1610 (setting forth a general rule of immunity and enumerating exceptions to the rule). One such exception is any case where "the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award rendered against
the foreign State." 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6). In addition, the FSIA provides
that certain assets of a foreign state, such as central bank or military assets,
are never subject to attachment or execution. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b).
261. Section 1605(a) (1) of the FSIA provides for an exception to sovereign immunity when immunity has been waived "either explicitly or by implication." For an analysis of the waiver exception to the FSIA that emphasizes
the distinction between waiving sovereign immunity and waiving personal
jurisdiction, see Victoria A. Carter, God Save the King: UnconstitutionalAssertions of PersonalJurisdictionover Foreign States in U.S. Courts, 82 VA. L. REv. 357
(1996).
262. For example, in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, ChiefJustice John
Marshall recognized express or implied waiver as the only legitimate exception to sovereign immunity, stating that any exception to sovereign immu" The Schooner
nity "must be derived from the consent of the sovereign ....
Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 143 (1812).
263. The House Report accompanying the FSIA in 1976 commented that
"[w]ith respect to implicit waivers, the courts have found such waivers in
cases where a foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another country."
FLOWERS, JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN

H.R. No. 94-1487, at 18 (1976). While a number of courts have
found implied waivers in international arbitration agreements, the issue is
not settled. See Seetransport Wiking Trader v. Navimpex Centrala, 989 F.2d
572, 578-79 (2d Cir. 1993) (implying a waiver of sovereign immunity from an
agreement to submit disputes to international arbitration); M.B.L. Int'l Contractors v. Republic of Trinidad, 725 F. Supp. 52 (D.D.C. 1989) (same); Ipitrade Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D.D.C.
1978) (same). But see S & Davis Int'l, Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d
1292 (11th Cir. 2000); Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of State of Qatar, 181 F.3d
118, 122-3 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding international arbitration agreement not
STATES,

to be a waiver, since the sovereign is not a party to the New York Conven-

tion); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 377 (7th
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has long been accepted that personal jurisdiction can be
waived; this idea has been accepted both on the international
264

level
and by the Supreme Court almost thirty years ago in its
decision The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co. 265 However, it

should not be necessary to find a waiver of personal jurisdiction where a U.S. court is enforcing an arbitral award issued
against a foreign state. Instead, what should matter in the enforcement context is whether the award is valid under the criteria set forth in the Convention and whether there are assets
Cir. 1985) ("[Mlost courts have refused to find an implicit waiver of immunity to suit in American courts from a contract clause providing for arbitration in a country other than the United States."); M.B.L. Int'l Contractors,725
F. Supp. at 54 n.3.
In commenting on an earlier version of the bill that became the arbitration amendment, Senator Lugar observed that the amendment would eliminate any ambiguity over whether agreements to arbitrate should be enforceable in U.S. courts against foreign sovereigns:
Consistent with our longstanding policy favoring arbitration in international commerce, the other provisions of this amendment
would perfect the [FSIA] to provide explicitly for the enforcement
of arbitral agreements or awards. Currently, agreements and
awards are enforced under the provisions of the FSIA that concern
explicit or implied waivers of immunity. Although courts are finding that arbitral agreements constitute waivers in the appropriate
cases, the amendment would give more explicit guidance to judges
in dealing with these cases.
132 CONG. REC. S14795 (1986) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
264. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 421(2) (g) (allowing jurisdiction to adjudicate if the defendant has consented to the exercise ofjurisdiction); Draft Hague Convention, supra note 19, art. 4; DICEY AND MORRIS
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, Rule 23(15) (9th ed. 1973) (explaining the
En-

glish law that permits personal jurisdiction where the contract terms allow
it).
265. The Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).

In The

Bremen, the Court upheld the validity of a forum selection clause in a contract between a U.S. and a German company specifying that any dispute arising out of the contract would be heard by the London Court ofJustice. The
Court rejected the argument that such clauses are improper, reasoning that
resistance to such clauses "reflects something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals," and suggesting that it should "give effect
to the legitimate expectations of the parties." Id. at 12. Of course, by agreeing to hear all disputes in the London Court of Justice, the U.S. company
effectively waived any defense it may have had relating to personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court also has held explicitly that the constitutional requirement of "minimum contacts" can be waived intentionally. See Ins.
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
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of the foreign state in the United States against which to enforce the award.
The law on enforcement of foreign judgments is somewhat analogous. Whether we look at U.S. or international law
on enforcement of judgments, lack of "minimum contacts"
does not constrain the power of a court to attach a defendant's
assets in order to enforce a judgment issued in another jurisdiction. 266 The issue in such a case is not whether the defendant possesses "minimum contacts" within the jurisdiction of
the enforcing court, but rather whether the defendant had
the jurisdiction of the court that issued
such contacts 2within
67
the judgment.
The same principle should apply to the enforcement of
arbitral awards. Indeed, if anything, the policy behind the free
enforceability of foreign arbitral awards may be stronger than
RESTATEMENT
266. See, e.g.,

OF THE LAW (SECOND)

OF JUDGMENTS

(1980),

§ 8, which addresses attachment jurisdiction:
"(1) A court may exercise jurisdiction to seize property whose situs
is in the state ... in an action concerning a claim against the owner
of the property if: The court could properly exercise jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claim ... or The action is to enforce a judgment
against the owner of the property. .. " (emphasis added).
The comments to section 8 explain that jurisdiction may be exercised in an
action to enforce a judgment, even in situations where jurisdiction might
otherwise not be found to exist, in order to further the broader social purpose of facilitating the enforceability of judgments. See id. § 8 cmt. d. On
the international level, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 481 cmt.
h ("[W] hereas a state has jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim on the basis of
presence of property in the forum only where the property is reasonably
connected with the claim, an action to enforce a judgment may usually be
brought wherever property of the defendant may be found.").
267. Of course the situation is different where the action to attach defendant's property is brought prior to judgment. The Supreme Court held in
Shaffer v. Heitner,433 U.S. 186 (1977) that the use of attachment to establish
quasi in remjurisdiction in Delaware, based solely on the presence of defendant's property within Delaware, violated the Due Process Clause. The
Court also suggested, however, that the outcome would have been different
if the action were brought to enforce ajudgment. See id. at 210 n.36 ("Once
it has been determined by a court ...that the defendant is a debtor of the
plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has property. . ."). See also
Smith v. Lorillard, Inc., 945 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that Shaffer
does not set limits on an ancillary action to enforce a previously-issued judgment); RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (SECOND) OFJJUDGMENTS § 8 cmt. d (1980)
(specifying that the use of attachment and other methods as provisional remedies is circumscribed by the Due Process Clause).
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that of foreign judgments, since the United States is bound by
international agreement to recognize and enforce arbitral
awards issued in other signatory states.2 68
Article III of the New York Convention requires that each
state "shall recognize arbitral awards as binding, ' 269 and Arti-

cle V of the Convention allows a U.S. court to refuse recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award only on very limited
bases. 270 Although Article V allows a signatory state to refuse
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award on public
policy grounds, in practice this exception is applied in very
narrow circumstances; courts have not invoked the public policy exception to decline enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award on the grounds that a party lacked "minimum contacts"
with the United States. The New York Convention requires
U.S. courts to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards so
long as the arbitration panel had authority to hear the dispute
and the arbitration was conducted in a state that is signatory to
the Convention. In this respect, it is analogous to the Full
268. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 39, § 487 cmt. c (explaining
that because of the New York Convention, supra note 43, which imposes a
treaty obligation to enforce arbitral awards, arbitral awards are more automatically enforced than judgments).
269. Article III provides in full:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding
and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid
down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the
recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
New York Convention, supra note 43, art. III.
270. Article V of the New York Convention provides that recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused only on the following bases: invalidity of the agreement to arbitrate; lack of notice to the adversely
affected party; ultra vires awards; arbitral procedure not in accordance with
the arbitration agreement; award set aside in the country of issue; subject
matter not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the enforcing court; and recognition and enforcement would violate the public policy
of the enforcing court. New York Convention, supra note 43, art. V. The
ICSID and the Inter-American Conventions similarly obligate signatory states
to recognize and enforce arbitral awards with very limited exceptions. See
ICSID Convention, supra note 46, art. 54 (providing no exceptions); InterAmerican Convention, supra note 42, art. 5 (listing essentially the same exceptions as the New York Convention).
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Faith and Credit Clause, 271 which requires enforcement of a
judgment rendered in another state (regardless of whether
the defendant has "minimum" contacts with the enforcing forum) 272

Although the implementing legislation to the New York
Convention allows for confirmation of a foreign arbitral award
by application to any court "having jurisdiction,"273 the personal jurisdiction requirement should be met once the presence within the jurisdiction of defendant's property can be
shown. 274 There are very few cases involving the enforcement
of a foreign arbitral award where the court refused to enforce
the award for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Transatlantic
Bulk Shipping v. Saudi Chartering,the only such case outside of
the FSLA context, a Liberian shipping company filed an action
in the Southern District of New York seeking confirmation of
an award issued by an arbitration panel in London against a
275 The court dismissed the petition
Panamanian corporation.
on the basis that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Panamanian corporation, noting that the defendant had no office,
bank account, employee, agent, or person authorized to re2 76 The court also commented that
ceive process in New York.

the legislation implementing the New York Convention
271. U.S.

CONST.,

272. See, e.g.,

JACK

art. IV,§ 1.
H. FRIEDENTHAL,

ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE

711 (3d ed.

1999) (citing Pennoyer and explaining that due process can trump the full
faith and credit obligation where there was no personal jurisdiction "in the
first court").
273. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1994).
274. The Restatement (Third) states that "[a]s in respect to judgments,
§ 481, Comment h, an action to enforce a foreign arbitral award requires

jurisdiction over the award debtor or his property."

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD),

supra note 39, § 487 cmt. c (1986). Section 481, comment h explains that,
whereas under U.S. law a state has jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim on the
basis of property only where the property is related to the claim, "an action
to enforce a judgment may usually be brought wherever property of the defendant is found, without any necessary connection between the underlying action
and the property, or between the defendant and the forum." Id. § 481 cmt. h (emphasis added). Thus, it would seem that in such enforcement actions international law does not require a jurisdictional nexus between the defendant
and the enforcing forum.
275. Transatlantic Bulk Shipping v. Saudi Chartering, 622 F. Supp. 25
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
276. See id. at 26.
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does not . . .give the court power over all persons
throughout the world who have entered into an arbitration agreement covered by the Convention. Some
basis must be shown, whether arising from the [defendant's] residence, his conduct, his consent, the location of his property or otherwise, to justify his being subject to the court's power. 277
Although the opinion cites InternationalShoe, the ruling in the
case might be explained by the fact that there was no property
of the defendant present in the jurisdiction against which to
execute the arbitral award.
U.S. courts have conducted a "minimum contacts" analysis in a number of actions to enforce arbitral awards against
foreign sovereign defendants. It is somewhat ironic that all of
these cases (other than TransatlanticBulk Shipping) involve foreign sovereign defendants under the FSIA rather than private
defendants. 2 78 Application of the "minimum contacts" test in
these cases generally did not affect the outcome of the suit,
because the courts generally found sufficient contacts in any
event to assert jurisdiction and enforce the arbitral award. 279
277. Id. at 27.
278. I conducted a search of all federal cases in the LEXIS database using
the terms (convention w/10 arbitra! or ICSID) and ("minimum contacts" or
"international shoe") (search conducted June 27, 2001). The only case I
could find involving the recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award
against a private party where the court conducted a minimum contacts analysis was TransatlanticBulk Shipping.
279. See, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader v. Navimpex Centrala, 989 F.2d
572 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding both implied waiver and minimum contacts);
Am. Constr. Mach. & Equip. Corp. v. Mechanised Constr. of Pak. Ltd., No.
85 Civ. 3765, 1986 WL 2973 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1986) (finding both implied
waiver and minimum contacts); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan ArabJamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (D.D.C. 1980) (finding both
implied waiver and minimum contacts), vacated, 684 F.2d 1032 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see also Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Banco de Seguros del Estado, 199
F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding implied waiver in a post-Creighton case); S
& Davis Int'l Inc. v. Republic of Yemen, 218 F.3d 1292 (lth Cir. 2000) (findingjurisdiction under the commercial activity exception and minimum contacts in a post-Creighton case). But see Concord Reinsurance Co. v. Caja Nacional de Ahorro Y Seguro, No. 94 Civ. 2218, 1994 WL 259826, at 1 (S.D.N.Y.
June 7, 1994) (dismissing without elaboration what was apparently an action
to enforce a foreign arbitral award against a foreign sovereign due to lack of
minimum contacts).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics

2001]

THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT

However, the D.C. Circuit in Creighton Ltd. v. Government of
State of Qatar refused to enforce an arbitral award under the
arbitration exception on grounds that the foreign sovereign
defendant did not possess "minimum contacts" with the
United States. 280 Creighton, a Cayman Islands company with
offices in the United States, had entered into an agreement
with the government of Qatar to build a new hospital. The
construction contract provided that the agreement was to be
governed by Qatari law and that all disputes were to be resolved "under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce" (ICC).281 The contract

did not specify where the arbitration was to be conducted.
About four years after the contract was signed, Qatar attempted to expel Creighton from the project and Creighton
commenced arbitration. Since the contract was silent as to the
place of arbitration, the ICC conducted the arbitration in
Paris. The arbitration panel awarded Creighton damages of
over $8 million. After Creighton was unsuccessful in attaching
Qatari assets in France, it brought an action in U.S. district
court to enforce the arbitration award. After the district court
dismissed the action, Creighton appealed. Although the circuit court found an exception to sovereign immunity under
the arbitration amendment, 28 2 it ultimately affirmed the disQatar lacked "minitrict court's dismissal on the grounds that
28 3
mum contacts" with the United States.
Assuming that Qatar had assets present within the United
States with which to enforce the award, the outcome in Creighton undermines the purpose of the arbitration amendment.
By refusing to enforce an arbitral award on grounds other
than those specified in Article V, the outcome is also in tension with the U.S. obligation under the New York Convention
and similar agreements. As one expert on international arbi280. Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir.

1999).
281. See id. at 120.

282. See id. at 124.
283. Interestingly, the court raised the possibility that the Due Process
Clause does not apply to foreign sovereigns. The Court referred to Weltover
and its "question [ing]" of the applicability of the Due Process Clause to for-

eign states. See Creighton, 181 F.3d at 124. However, the court fudged on this
issue and applied the "minimum contacts" test on the grounds that the issue
was not argued by the plaintiff. See id. at 124-25.
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tration put it, allowing a state that has agreed to arbitration to
avoid confirmation of the arbitral award on the basis of sovereign immunity "should make a mockery of the arbitration process." 28 4 International practice relating to recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards generally has been to
recognize and enforce arbitration awards on principles analogous to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Thus, a finding that a foreign state is not a "person"
should have little effect on cases involving the enforcement of
awards falling under the arbitration exception; 2 5 these awards
should be enforceable without regard to "minimum contacts"
wherever the state's attachable assets may be found.
V.

CONCLUSION

The United States, along with fifty286, other countries, is

currently in the process of negotiating the Hague Convention
on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 28 7 The draft treaty has been in negotiations for
almost ten years and, if adopted, could fundamentally alter the
United States's approach to jurisdictional questions. Although
the implications of the agreement for Internet-related activity
284.

DELAUME, supra note 45, at 73.
285. An issue that the FSIA does not directly address is whether an action
may be brought against a foreign sovereign to enforce a foreign judgment.
In contrast to the arbitration exception, there is no special exception to immunity under the FSIA to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment in the
United States. U.S. courts have dismissed actions brought to enforce a foreign judgment against a foreign sovereign defendant where the foreign sovereign defendant did not waive immunity and the conduct underlying the
judgment fell outside the commercial activity exception. See Transatlantic v.
Shanghai Foreign Trade Corp., 204 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied 121
S. Ct. 1227 (2001); Int'l Hous. Ltd. v. Rafidain Bank Iraq, 893 F.2d 8, 10-11
(2d Cir. 1989).
286. For a list of member countries to the Hague Conference, see the website for the Hague Conference at http://www.hcch.net/e/members/
members.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2002).
287. Draft Hague Convention, supra note 19. There is a subsequent, interim draft of the convention that contains a substantial number of proposed revisions to the text. See Summary of the Outcome of the Discussion
in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6-20 June
2001, Interim Text prepared by the Permanent Bureau and the Co-reporters, at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2002). This article refers to the October 1999 version of the Draft Convention, and not the interim draft.
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have become the subject of recent controversy in the United
States, 28 8 the proposed treaty could benefit U.S. plaintiffs
greatly. Among other things, the treaty, if enacted, would facilitate greatly the enforcement of judgments in jurisdictions
that often have been unwilling to do so, so long as the court
issuing the judgment had jurisdiction over the dispute and
both that court and the enforcing court are in signatory states.
By enacting the treaty, the United States in effect would be
agreeing to a more "European" approach to jurisdictional law
in exchange for facilitating the enforcement of U.S. judg28 9
ments in other signatory states.
The Draft Hague Convention's approach to jurisdiction is
"European" in that it centers around principles of general and
specific jurisdiction rather than on a determination of "minimum contacts." Although in some instances jurisdiction may
be allowed under the treaty where existing U.S. law might prohibit it,290 personal jurisdiction under the treaty is in many
288. See, e.g., Tied up in Knots, ECONOMIST, Jun. 9-15, 2001, at 67; Christopher Stern, Copyright Holders v. Telecoms: Interests Clash in Debate on Regulating
Global Commerce, WASH. POST, May 16, 2001, at E4.
289. See Kevin M. Clermont, JurisdictionalSalvation and the Hague Treaty, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 89, 95-97 (1999). For more than twenty years, the European Union countries' approach to recognizing and enforcing each other's
judgments has been governed by international agreement. See Convention
on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969), revised by Convention on Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and of the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, Oct. 9, 1978, 18 I.L.M. 8
(1979) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. For a description of the Brussels
Convention, see Degnan & Kane, supra note 69, at 850-54;Juenger, American
Jurisdiction,supra note 135, at 17-20.
290. For example, specific jurisdiction for tort actions is allowed under the
Draft Hague Convention in the courts of the state "in which the injury
arose," unless the defendant can establish that "the person claimed to be
responsible could not reasonably have foreseen that the act or omission"
could have resulted in injury in that state. See Draft Hague Convention,
supra note 19, art. 10(1) (a). It is thus conceivable that jurisdiction could be
asserted over a tortfeasor that lacked "minimum contacts" with the state. See
also Memorandum, supra note 228, at 2 (explaining that the United States
cannot, consistent with the Due Process Clause, "accept tort jurisdiction
based solely on the place of injury, or contract jurisdiction based solely on
place of performance stated in the contract").
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ways more circumscribed than under U.S. law. 29 1 It seems

likely that, under the Draft Hague Convention, the Altmann
court's assertion of jurisdiction over the Republic of Austria
would be prohibited, 292 and no enforcing court would be allowed to recognize and enforce any judgment issued by the
293
Altmann court.

In the opinion of some experts, the Draft Hague Convention's approach to jurisdictional questions would improve
greatly upon the existing U.S. approach by making the rules of
jurisdiction more certain and restrained. 294 In my opinion,
the Draft Hague Convention also would improve on U.S. jurisdictional law in another respect-by clarifying that the treaty
and its jurisdictional rules apply equally to (non-immune) gov-

291. For example, general jurisdiction under the Draft Hague Convention
is limited to the state where the defendant is "habitually resident" and prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction based solely on "doing business" in the
state. See Draft Hague Convention, supra note 19, arts. 3(1), 18(2) (e); see also
William S. Dodge, Antitrust and the Draft HagueJudgments Convention, 32 LAw
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 363 (2001) (arguing that the Draft Hague Convention's
approach to limiting jurisdiction in antitrust cases is too stringent).
292. This follows from two different provisions of the Draft Hague Convention: First, under article 10, tort jurisdiction is only allowed in the place
where the tort or the injury occurs, and second, under article 18(2)(e), the
treaty specifically prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction based solely on "the
carrying on of commercial or other activities" in the forum unless the cause
of action arises directly out of such activity. Draft Hague Convention, supra
note 19. Although there is a proposed exception for violations of international law, see id. art. 18(3), the variants of the exception that have been
proposed are limited at the very least to violations that amount to "a serious
crime under international law."
293. For discussion of the facts of Altmann, see supra Part I.
294. Professor Clermont writes that the Draft Hague Convention, if
adopted, would be the "salvation" of U.S. law on territorial authority to adjudicate, and suggests that Congress should enact the jurisdictional part of the
treaty as domestic law:
The limits and failures of the current constitutional doctrine
demonstrate that the Supreme Court has tried to do too much in
shaping the law of territorial jurisdiction out of the few bare words
of a constitutional clause. Nothing in the Court's raw materialthe Constitution, subject to judicial interpretation-can generate a
set of criteria that would be both sensible and certain. Legislative
regulation is necessary.
Clermont, supra note 289, at 106.
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ernment and non-government defendants. 29 5 Thus, if the
treaty were adopted and ratified by the United States, it would
set clear limits on a U.S. court's ability to exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign defendant, limits that would trump
the jurisdictional provisions of the FSIA.
Regardless of whether the Draft Hague Convention is enacted, the Convention's recognition of the applicability of jurisdictional rules to sovereign defendants is the correct approach. U.S. courts addressing this issue should separate the
constitutional question (whether a foreign state is entitled to
raise constitutional challenges to U.S. government action)
from the jurisdictional question (whether assertion of jurisdiction over a sovereign defendant would violate internationallyrecognized limits). Even if a foreign state is held not to be a
"person" for due process purposes, the state still should be entitled to protection from certain extraterritorial assertions of
personal jurisdiction. For the time being, the customary international law of personal jurisdiction is an appropriate protective filter through which to interpret and apply the FSIA.

295. See Draft Hague Convention, supra note 19, art. 1 (3) (specifying that
a dispute is "not excluded from the scope of the Convention by the mere
fact" that a foreign state is a party).
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